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Abstract 
 
Ericsson Money Services as a financial software program develops mobile services the aim of 
which is to provide worldwide money transactions. The development of the service includes 
multifunctional processes and a number of partnering organizations hence emerging hindrances 
in uncertainty management and risk assessment. On the one hand the vast influence of the 
external factors on the program and on the other hand the multiple projects running under the 
same program hamper to apply the traditional risk management approaches effectively. 
Financial programs encompass variety of dynamic processes and the risk management process 
becomes a momentous activity to be done thoroughly. This thesis work examines the main issues 
of traditional risk management methods while applying in financial software development 
processes at the same time provides a stepwise procedure to guide what information must be 
collected and registered, how the evaluation processes must be carried out and what approaches 
to apply in order to succeed in the risk management activities in program level. The information 
that we provide on how to register the potential hazardous events is not optional for any 
financial software program as it can be specific dependent on external influencing factors. 
Conversely the estimation methods are all-embracing and do not require further examination in 
its application in other software programs. The specified eight plus one steps of risk 
management iteration herein framework provides a complete guide on how to carry out the risk 
management activity without other supportive guidance and additional advanced knowledge in 
the field. The examples we cite in the thesis are chosen both concerning to the field and simple 
life situations to be easily graspable. The risk-specific information that must be registered is 
discussed and guided. In addition the procedure that we present and the information that must be 
collected specifically for Ericsson Money Services operation are implemented and provided in 
the tool of UniRisk. 
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1. Introduction 
 
But indeed, another way is open to us here by which we may obtain what is sought; and what you cannot deduce a 
priori, you can at least deduce a posteriori. 
Jacob Bernoulli, 1713, in his   “Art of Conjecture” 
 
Any type of organization irrespective what the field of its performance is, has to make optimal 
decisions while carrying on business operations. The decision making is a core action towards 
reaching any kind of goal. Whenever the appropriate decision is made it becomes clear which the 
following actions are. But how optimal our chosen decision is can be checked later on when we 
have results. Before the final results we have only uncertainties. Does not matter what the source 
of the uncertainties is and why it can have malicious consequence we need to have an idea of 
how to measure the possible impact of it on our life or goals. Although we are sometimes unable 
to prevent the possible adverse event on us or our properties, we are always capable to measure 
its likelihood and severeness and thus frame several strategies to avoid or reduce the effect of it. 
But there is always a variety of factors that becomes hindrance while measuring the probability 
of adverse events and sometimes even the impact. In the field of software engineering a 
widespread measurement method is the traditional risk assessment method which implies to 
measure the probability of the adverse event, the impact in case the event happens and calculate 
the product of that two values which is usually called risk exposure and shows how much the 
average loss is [10]. Another mainstream is the three point estimation method which implies that 
the expected impact of loss is uncertain and suggests establishing the upper and lower bounds of 
the loss [9]. 
In the field of software engineering when a multifunctional and hierarchical program runs 
towards a set of goals and contains several projects, the effective risk management becomes a 
complicated task. The main reason is that not only the assessment and mitigation of risks are 
important activities but also the understanding of how the same risk can affect different projects 
and how these projects are interconnected each other because of common adverse event. The 
multiple mitigation activities because of the same risk take a lot of unnecessary cost, so the 
communication between these projects becomes a vital activity. Also different projects apply 
different software development methodologies thus they require different frequency of risk 
identification and mitigation sessions. Because of unparallel risk management activities the 
communication usually can fail among different projects and unnecessary expended cost for a 
risk is inevitable.  
Ericsson Money Services as a financial program which contains several interrelated projects is a 
typical example of the upper described software program. An effective and easy-to-use program 
risk management method, which unifies such important activities as identification, analysis, 
mitigation, control and monitor, dependencies of several projects due to the same hazardous 
9 | P a g e  
situation and other minor activities, is one of the success factors to measure and keep track of 
opportunities and risks.  
In this thesis work we introduce a software program risk management approach which can be 
applied for any kind of software project development processes integrated within any 
development methodology. Additionally we propose a new technique of risk assessment which 
combines quantitative and qualitative assessments of risks. We also discuss the downsides of the 
traditional and triple estimation methods, where those two are effective to apply, how to avoid 
erroneous results and how to bypass the emerged problems while assessing the risks. 
 
1.1. Definitions and Abbreviations 
 
EMS ( Ericsson Money Services) Mobile money service launched by Ericsson 
HUB A wired network that connects different 
devices together 
MiniRisk The checklist tool used by Ericsson for the 
purposes of risk management 
UniRisk The risk management checklist tool as the 
result of the thesis 
SDP (Solution Design Program) The program of Ericsson under which 
Ericsson Money Services run 
YEN The official currency of Japan 
GBP The official currency of the United Kingdom 
EURO The official currency of the Euro zone 
countries 
SEK The official currency of Sweden 
KPI (Key Performance Indicators) Performance measurement indicator 
 
Table 1: Definitions and Abbreviations 
 
1.2. Thesis disposition 
 
The thesis is divided in three main parts. The first part consists of sections one and two starting 
with an introduction to the studied field, an overview of the field’s background and a detailed 
presentation of the Ericsson Money Services operation. Continuing in this part we describe the 
problem domain, analyze the purpose of the thesis by defining specific research questions and 
present the results of our work along with the followed working methodology. The second part is 
the core part of the presented document through section three and provides our approach of 
solving the problem domain points. Our solution is broken down into sequential steps in order to 
provide the reader with a comprehensive and complete understanding. We start each section of 
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this part by providing the background and theory of each step. We continue by outlining our 
concerns, issues and points to be improved along with a simple scenario in order to describe how 
the theoretical background is connected and applied to real world situations. The third and last 
part consists of sections four, five and six and provides the evaluation of our work, points of 
discussion and further research concerns. Concluding the document we draw our conclusion 
based on our findings and experience of doing this thesis. 
 
1.3.  Background 
 
"Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it." 
Socrates 
 
Life is full of uncertainties that can have negative or positive impact to our actions and plans. 
Some of these uncertainties can be measured and some not. Whenever the uncertainty is 
measurable it means we can measure the probability of the uncertainty and the consequences of 
it on our environment. When the uncertainty is related to human life, activities or goals we are 
used to say that there is a risk or risky situation. A risk for an individual or an organization is a 
possibility of an adverse event to occur and have impact to their properties, reputation, goals 
and/or objectives. Conversely an opportunity is the possibility of a favourable event to occur or 
not and have impact to properties, reputation, goals and/or objectives. In reality we use to keep 
track more of risks than of opportunities because the security of what we already have is more 
important than the hope to get things without earning. A positive property of risks is that we can 
prevent and eliminate them by performing some activities related to the management of them. 
The related activities in order to manage risks are organized and applied through risk 
management. The risk management process is used when we want to quantify and qualify 
potential risky situations that might bring potential losses to current or future investments. 
Risk management nowadays becomes more and more popular in the field of software 
engineering and applied IT, although it is in an immature level in contradiction with the financial 
and insurance domains. But different domains have different concerns and therefore different 
risks and approaches to risk management [15][19]. For instance a project manager responsible 
for a mobile application game has concerns of attractiveness of the game and can identify risks 
relating to it. On the other hand a failed money transaction through a banking system is 
conceptually different risk that might cause loss of money and definitely damage the reputation 
of the bank and the trust of the customer. 
 
The importance of risk management in software engineering and applied IT is driven through 
different factors. The most important factor is the number of failed projects that have impact to 
the financial stability of the organizations and to the overall reputation of the organization as 
well [7]. A failed project can express high unmanaged cost to the organization by influencing the 
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financing of other projects that are related to it and also by influencing the financial state of the 
organization. There are many examples of organizations that have failed to apply risk 
management and the financial collapse of a project led the organization to bankruptcy. 
 
The most common and effective way to deal with risk management process is to apply it and 
integrate it within the project management methodologies. The parallel and systematic 
application of them to a project minimizes significantly the chance of a project failure or exceeds 
the initial financial plan. Unfortunately there is no any formal existing methodology to combine 
both risk and project management and the application of both depends on the organization, the 
industrial domain that the organization operates in, the project type and the project management 
methodology that is applied. Thus risk management is a very flexible process that might consists 
of fixed steps as we see in the coming sections of the thesis but nevertheless these steps can be 
adjusted, modified and applied with respect to the nature of each project and standards that 
different organizations apply. 
 
1.4. Ericsson Money Services 
 
“In an age where a single click books a flight or updates your relationship status, isn’t it a bit strange that your 
money is still so … analogue?”  
 Ericsson, EMS (2011) 
 
Since August 2011 Ericsson launched its first of a variety of new mobile money services which 
is called Ericsson Money Services. Ericsson Money Services was initially launched and operates 
in seven European countries which are Sweden, UK, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and Poland. 
This was the first step by Ericsson in order to expand the service availability to the rest of Europe 
and also in a word wide range and become a global service in the future. Through Ericsson 
Money Services Ericsson aims to provide a full suite of convenient, cost-efficient, secure and 
instant mobile financial service to consumers globally. Users can sign up and create easily a safe 
and secure online mobile wallet. They are able to access their money safely from the Ericsson 
Money Services network through their mobile phones in order to send, receive money from and 
withdraw cash. All the transactions described above are done through a network that connects 
the electronic money wallets with different telecom operators and banks across the world. 
The whole process of money transaction via Ericsson Money Services is done with a simple 
SMS message. The user can send a simple text from wherever he/she is located to another person 
who sits in the next corner or to a relative who lives thousand miles away. The service offers 
greater freedom of choice, access to money and a faster and more convenient way to transfer 
money to friends and family. People who can use the service are: 
 Families: parents can send money to their children that are away at the university, on 
holidays or in a gap year. 
12 | P a g e  
 Social sharers: people can conveniently share the cost of a meal, settle small debts and 
transfer money between friends and family. 
 Cash-only consumers: consumers used to transacting only with cash can take a first step 
into banking. 
 Non-domestic workers: overseas workers can send money back home to their families 
without having to use postal or personal cash transfers, which are often time-intensive. 
 
Using a simple scenario we describe a possible money transaction using Ericsson Money 
Services in order to provide the reader with an outline of the service operation. Suppose that Ida, 
who lives in Sweden wants to send some money to her friend Jane, who lives in UK and once 
again she wasted some of the money that she is supposed to pay her rent with. Both the two 
friends have completed the registration process to the service and they have provided the 
required information in order to complete the secure process, using their mobile phones. After, 
Ida wanted to fill her account on her mobile wallet by providing her credit or debit card and her 
bank account or even cash. Eventually she loaded 1000 SEK from her bank account to her 
mobile wallet. Then she wanted to send the 1000 SEK to her friend Jane. Instead of waiting 
around three days for the transaction via a banking system, she performed a few clicks on her 
mobile phone and the money was instantly transferred to Jane’s money wallet together with an 
SMS confirmation. The figure below visualizes the money transaction from mobile wallet – to – 
mobile wallet using the blue dotted line. The red dotted line symbolizes the time latency of the 
traditional money transaction through a common bank – to – bank account which is significantly 
slower.  
 
Figure 1: Simple mobile-to mobile money transaction through Ericsson Money Services 
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The transaction was done through a sequence of steps performed by Ericsson Money Services. 
When Ida pushed the “send” button on her mobile phone a series of events were sent to the 
Ericsson service provider of Sweden that got the transaction. After the service provider of 
Sweden forwarded the transaction to the central interconnect HUB of Ericsson Money Services.  
The central HUB converted the currency and sent the transaction to the service provider in UK. 
The UK service provider performed all the debit and credit transaction at the same time and 
afterwards it sent the transaction to Jane’s mobile wallet. All the transactions described above are 
visualized in the figure below. 
 
Figure 2: Basic interactions between devices though Ericsson Money Services operation 
As Ericsson claims, “Ericsson Money Service is a money transaction from point A to point B 
which is fast, simple and in the hand of the user [20][21]. 
The operation of Ericsson Money Services seems to be simple, but in reality lurks many critical 
concerns and potential risks. In order for the service to run successfully these risks have to be 
identified and dealt with. Ericsson applies risk management aiming to eliminate the potential 
risks, but is the common risk management approach for a typical IT project applicable to a 
financial IT project as Ericsson Money Service? If it is not, how can we make project risk 
management efficient for financial IT projects? The answers to these questions we find out in the 
coming sections of this framework. 
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1.5. Problem Domain 
 
“We cannot solve problems by using the same kind of thinking we used when we created them.” 
Albert Einstein 
The problem domain of this study was initially provided to us by the Head of Design and 
Deployment of Ericsson. Ericsson Money Services is a new business area for Ericsson as it is 
their first financial IT project. Even if it applies the same or a similar risk management approach 
within this area (IT projects), there are some new and undiscovered risks that possibly will occur. 
The global character of Ericsson Money Service and the assignment of new sales teams 
frequently contain these new undiscovered risks. In order to minimize the risk to not capture the 
most important and regular seen risks, a kind of intelligent risk checklist for financial IT projects 
needs to be developed.  
Based on the strategy and the uptake of new contracts there were a variety of solutions and 
process development activities ongoing within Ericsson Money Services organization. Those 
activities were summarized in a program called Solution Design Program. This program contains 
several projects, in which different project development methodologies such as Agile and 
Waterfall are applied. The Waterfall model based projects follow the PROPS [17] methodology, 
whereas the Agile projects run according to Scrum [2]. The Solution Design Program is also 
heavily connected to the program that drives all customer projects since most of the customer 
projects are dependent on deliveries of it. Neither the size of the Solution Design Program, nor 
the volatility in the activities are on a level ensured that an application of a full-scale risk 
management suits. 
In addition it has been identified that the program, its projects and subprograms need to keep 
track of risks and opportunities as well as of dependencies among projects due to emerged 
uncertainty factors across the projects. The terminology of dependencies particularly refers on 
the one hand to the dependency of risks that exist in different projects running under the same 
program and on the other hand to the dependencies of projects due to common risks. This is how 
common risks influence the operation of specific projects on the one hand and the whole 
program on the other hand. Simply stated, a risk dependency concept in a program is the 
interrelation of two or more projects due to an emerged risk in any of those projects.  
Simplifying the description above, we have derived two main points of the problem domain that 
are presented below. 
 MiniRisk does not foreseen for international financial IT projects. An international 
financial IT project is a long-term industrial project, based upon the projected cash flows, 
across different systems and devices that cooperate for the accomplishment of the goal 
determined by the project.  
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 There is no standard method to keep track of opportunities and dependencies among 
projects that run under the same program in order to achieve a greater goal. 
As it is described above, the problem domain seems to be general without referrals on specific 
malfunctions and drawbacks of MiniRisk. The examination of the MiniRisk has disclosed the 
omissions and downsides that we present below. 
 When it comes to financial IT projects the source of the risk can be heavily depended on 
external factors, such as to which country the customer belongs to, with whom the 
organization has a contract and what type of customer it is (financial institution, 
organization, etc). Governmental, legal, and constitutional rules differ from country to 
country and from organization to organization creating variety of issues. The spawning 
uncertainties at this range are wide and need to be sorted and classified. 
 Whenever a risk is identified we may have principally different mitigation approaches or 
strategies. Every such strategy has a cost and the potential for risk reduction. The issue is 
that there is no unequivocal index for cost-effectiveness to indicate which mitigation 
approach is the best one to be applied. Mostly the experienced risk managers can judge 
from loss distribution parameters and specific tasks which strategy would be the optimal 
but when those parameters are getting to a similar range it becomes a tricky task. 
 The current applied method that is based on the three point estimation technique [22] has 
some inefficiency due to undefined type of loss distribution, skewness effect of the 
distribution and such called “either-or” type of risks, which are events that might turn up 
and  if they turn up there is a severe effect. 
 Another issue appears when the risk management process contains some uncertainty 
factors and the parameters of these factors might vary over time. The reasons of these 
variations can be different. The severity of impact, the likelihood of adverse event, how 
much it concerns to the specific task and how widely it can affect the other projects, as 
well as on the overall organizational assets can also vary. The absence of control to the 
upper mentioned issues may bring some serious problems. Based on such problems, risk 
management must capture not only the phases of identification, analysis and mitigation 
but also the control on its evolution simultaneously. 
 While performing risk management in projects the whole process is relatively more 
efficient.  When it comes to program level, having different interconnected projects 
running towards the same goal, the risk management process becomes a complicated and 
competitive task.  One reason is that risks which emerge in one project can somehow 
affect other projects and the program as a whole. Another important reason is that one 
risk emerged in one project can be heavily correlated to another risk in a second project. 
Sometimes even risks are counted twice or several times on different projects or even 
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worse, not counted at all because it is expected to be counted in one of the other projects. 
Those factors can create an impediment towards effective risk management. 
The purpose of the thesis and the outcomes is discussed in the coming section. 
 
1.6.  Purpose  
 
“Efforts and courage are not enough without purpose and direction.” 
John F. Kennedy 
 
The purpose of this study is to provide solution for managing risks in financial IT projects in 
program context. We aim to provide guidance for all the phases of the risk management iteration 
and to meet the needs of both experts and beginners in the field. Also we intend to provide 
suggestions on how to use risk management iterations in the most productive way and an 
accurate outcome along with a new approach of how to perform some specific steps on the 
iterations. Below we list the concerns as we have received them by Ericsson. 
 Create intelligent risk checklist tool for financial IT projects such as Ericsson Money 
Services. 
 Differentiate between different types of contracts, different types of legislations in the 
target countries and different kinds of partners (telecom operators, banks, etc.). 
 Use the Solution Design Program (SDP) characteristics and information which already 
applies two different project development processes such as Waterfall (PROPS model) 
and Agile (Scrum methodology) to analyze and define a new approach. 
 Create a new risk management approach for SDP risk management operation in order to 
allocate risks among projects applying different project development methodology. 
 
In order to be able to achieve the purpose described above and at the same time successfully 
fulfil our thesis, we derive the following research questions placed bellow. 
RQ1: How could we frame an easy and efficient approach of software project risk management, 
that is applicable within the Solution Design Program and within any project that apply the same 
development methodologies (PROPS or Scrum) as the Solution Design Program projects? 
RQ2: Could the new software project risk management approach be integrated and applied on 
software development processes? 
RQ3: How to frame an effective and easy-to-use method to deal with risk dependencies and how 
can it be integrated with the software project risk management iteration and the new checklist? 
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1.7. Results 
 
“I've always believed that if you put in the work, the results will come.” 
Michael Jordan 
 
The analysis of available data and the problem statement implies the general expected outcome 
of this work as it is presented bellow with bullet points: 
 
 An efficient way to work with the risks of financial IT projects. It should differentiate 
between different types of contracts, different types of legislation in the target country 
and different kind of partners (Telecom operators, banks, etc.).  
 Creation of a simple, efficient, transparent and easy-to-understand-and-maintain risk 
management instrument, in order to carry out an efficient risk management process. 
Efficiency in this case is quite high standard, as industry standards in financial IT projects 
are significantly high.  
 Examination of both the empirical analysis and theoretical background of risk 
management and   the adaption of the new approach to both areas. 
 The allowance of an easy-to-be-followed, able-to-be-integrated in the risk management 
iterations and understandable through simple steps risks dependencies controlling 
method. 
 
 A concrete and thorough final paper to communicate our findings and the final result of 
our work. This paper should be easy to be read and understood, by people from the 
industry like the Head of Design and Deployment of Ericsson, people in the research 
area, like our university supervisor and people who have only slight relation with the 
domain of risk management, like our university colleagues. 
2. Methodology 
 
 
“Method is much, technique is much, but inspiration is even more” 
Benjamin Cardozo 
 
This section focuses on the research and working methodology that we have followed in order to 
finalize this thesis. The purpose of this section is to provide an overview of all the activities that 
have been carried out during the life cycle of our work. We have started with our project plan 
and the work break down structure along with the strategy that we followed in order keep track 
of time and activities and also to deliver specific tasks. In addition, we provide the resources 
collection, analysis and validation, concluding with a reference to our communication plan. 
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Planning 
 
At the earliest phase of our work, in collaboration with our Ericsson supervisor we created a 
concrete and flexible project plan which would be our compass, guidance and common 
understanding of what to deliver and when. In the project plan we have also specified the internal 
and external interfaces of our project organization. The internal team organization interfaces 
includes the two of us as master’s students at the IT University of Gothenburg doing their thesis, 
on the topic of “Integrated project risk management in program context”. On the other hand the 
external organizations were Herwig Stöckl as our Ericsson supervisor, Jörgen Hansson as the 
university supervisor and every other stakeholder who contributes to our work. Having the 
stakeholders identified, we assigned the key roles that everyone would have during the thesis. 
 
Having the crystallized problem domain, expected outcome, available stakeholders and time 
constraints clarified we broke down the available time into milestones. In every milestone we 
have defined the task to be completed, along with the needed input of information and data in 
order to behold tasks to be examined and completed with the desired outcome. The start date and 
deadline for each milestone has been also specified. At the end of each milestone the expected 
outcome has been described. The status and relevant comments in cases of delay, constraints or 
interesting findings that might influence the rest of the milestones has been reported. We agreed 
that the project plan should be reviewed and updated every two weeks. 
 
Working strategy 
 
The process we have followed consists of two parts. The first stage of thesis work includes the 
background, theoretical and empirical study of the domain and the research. The second stage 
includes the creation of a risk management checklist tool which should operate based on the 
findings of the first part and be connected to our research study. This second stage represents the 
implementation part of the thesis. 
 
Our checklist has been created to support the risk management iterations. Therefore we 
performed intensive research and analysis of the different steps that are followed during the risk 
management iterations. For instance for the risk identification process, we got a standard 
iterations steps of how risk identification iteration is being done by our Ericsson supervisor. 
After we have performed research and analysis ourselves aiming to find vulnerable 
organizational assets and also see how these assets could be protected. Having the input results 
of our research available, we have implemented that specific part of the tool that is used for the 
risks identification. The same process has been carried out for the rest of the tool’s functionality. 
More detailed analysis can be found at the solution section (Section 3) of the document. 
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Resource Acquisition 
 
The availability, collection, analysis and utilization of resources have been critical during our 
work and the manipulation of them could make the difference in terms of success or failure of 
the thesis. The needed information in our case had come iteratively and from a variety of 
different resources which we present below. 
 
Literature: We have chosen the literature according to our supervisors’ guidelines and our own 
research in the domain. Those included books, research papers and publications. Also we got 
relevant literature materials that have been recommended by Ericsson. 
 
Standard bodies: Ericsson relies on the Project Management Institute and henceforth follows 
the ISO 31000 standard of project risk management [22]. 
 
Statistical data: We analyzed data that the organization has collected during the life cycle of the 
Solution Design Program. 
 
Existing solutions: The already existing checklist which is now used for risks analysis and 
mitigation was given to us. Also we got a detailed description of the Solution Design Program 
operation, concerning the risks identification and management. In addition we found and we 
used risk management tools that are available on the market in order to identify glitches on the 
one hand and get inspiration on the other hand. 
 
Stakeholders: It has been crucial to have stakeholders’ clear identification and description. In 
addition we needed to know the availability of them and the level of involvement that they have 
in the project. Also we wanted all the relevant information that they could provide to us in order 
to analyze different tasks. 
 
Resource analysis  
 
Aiming to work in a productive way, we have categorized the needed data in the categories 
mentioned above. Every single resource, when collected, has been stored according to its usage 
and context. Afterwards according to the specified task that had to be carried out, we have 
retrieved the proper data that had to be examined, analyzed and used to contribute our work and 
increase the level of accuracy and quality. The resource analysis was ongoing during the whole 
life cycle of the thesis project. 
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Resource credibility 
 
Having many resources collected almost every day, it was of great need to check the credibility 
and objectivity of them. We have examined specifically the source of information and the time 
period during which they were being available. Some of the collected resources has been decided 
to be unnecessary or inaccurate and therefore they had to be removed without further usage. 
Knowing that the resources provided by Ericsson and the books written by the experts in the 
field of risk management are credible enough, we had to focus our credibility research on the on 
line resources and the research papers particularly. Therefore we analyzed in depth the results 
that the related books and research papers were bringing to the light. By combining those results 
we judged which really interesting findings were and therefore they could be used as support to 
our work and which were inaccurate and could bring misunderstandings and wrong assumptions. 
 
3. Proposed Solution 
 
“When you think you can or you cannot do something, you are probably right” 
Henry Ford 
 
In this section we provide a stepwise procedure describing how to identify, assess, mitigate, 
control and communicate the arisen risks. The first eight steps are in full description of financial 
IT project risk management and the ninth step is the guidance of how to communicate the 
common risks in interconnected projects in a program context. 
 
3.1. Project Risk Management Iteration 
 
“Be prepared to cut your losses - Cancelling bad projects early is success because you save time, money and 
resources that can be applied to better opportunities.” 
Kurt Bittner, “Managing Iterative Software Development Projects”  
 
As project risk management iteration we consider all the necessary activities that are performed 
through the entire life cycle of a project in order to identify, evaluate and eliminate potential 
risks partly or completely. It is described as a continuous sequence of phases and the completion 
of them aims the successful handling and confrontation of risks. The project risk management 
iteration is an ongoing activity that is applied within the project development methodologies. It 
starts with the requirements specification and continues till the project’s deployment and 
maintenance. The business and systems goals are analyzed with respect to uncertainties and 
threats that can influence our decisions. During the phase of project risk management iteration is 
the first time that most of the project stakeholders sit at the same table and perform business and 
systems analysis with respect to uncertainties. 
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According to the Project Management Institute [18], the phases of project risk management are 
six. Our approach includes the existing defined phases plus two additional phases due to the 
special character that financial IT projects have. Therefore a complete project risk management 
iteration for financial IT projects according to our research should consists of eight phases where 
each one has a specific expected outcome and an optional ninth one in case of correlated projects 
in program context. These eight plus one phases along with their expected outcome are presented 
below. 
 
Risk management iteration planning: A specific approach and plan for project risk 
management is defined. The frequency of the iteration, the facilitator and key participants of the 
project risk management iteration are specified also. 
 
Risk identification: The risk management team identifies the potential adverse events and 
makes decisions which of them are severe enough to be examined further. The outcome of this 
phase is a full list of potential risks and opportunities that might have positive or negative impact 
to the project. 
 
Risk qualitative assessment: The risks that we have identified in the identification phase are 
evaluated qualitatively. The relative probability of a risk to occur and the relative effect are 
calculated along with the evaluation of exposure.  
 
Risk quantitative assessment: The risks are assessed in terms of money. The effect that the 
risks have on the overall project objectives and assets is analyzed with respect to the time plan 
and budget of the project. 
 
Risk response plan: The response in order to deal with each risk individually is specified. 
During this phase all the available options and actions are defined in order to enhance 
opportunities and reduce threats to the project objectives. After this phase every risk has its 
corresponding response plan. 
 
Risk analysis: The analysis of the different available responses to a particular risk is performed. 
The cost of the response plan to the overall project budget is examined and the optimal 
countermeasure is chosen according to its cost-effectiveness. 
 
Risk monitor and control: The uncertain events that influence a risk and the performance of the 
response plan are tracked. In addition the effectiveness of the response plan is evaluated 
throughout the project life cycle. 
 
Analysis of inceptive event of risk: Inceptive hazardous events that might become potential 
risks of the project are identified and monitored. 
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Risk iteration report: A complete report containing all the relevant information about the 
results of the project risk management iteration is handed to the project or program manager and 
to the project stakeholders for evaluation and confirmation. 
 
Risk dependencies management: This phase is applied to correlated projects that run under the 
same program. After the completion of each project risk management iteration for each project 
individually, a coordination of actions between the different projects takes place in order to 
report correlated risks and dependencies of risks among the different projects.  
 
The frequency and number of project risk management iterations depends on the character of 
each project and can vary from organization to organization. The three most important factors 
that determine the frequency of the project risk management iteration are the software 
development methodology that is applied to a specific project, the longevity of each project and 
the variability of factors that influence the project. As it has been reported to us by Ericsson the 
project risk management iterations differ in terms of frequency among projects that have high 
longevity and projects that have low longevity. In projects that have high longevity the project 
risk management iteration is performed only once at the beginning of the project, and on the 
contrary, projects that have short longevity are exposed to project risks management iteration 
every two weeks. Also projects that apply Agile Scrum are more likely to apply project risk 
management iteration more frequently than projects that apply the Waterfall PROPS. 
 
In our case as, we deal with a financial IT project, the project risk management iteration is 
performed very frequently due to the longevity of the project (as Ericsson launches runs and 
maintains Ericsson Money Services). Project longevity implies many uncertain technical and 
financial factors that influence the project and the variety of different partners that co-operate 
towards the goal of the service. In the following sections we focus on every phase of the project 
risk management iteration individually and provide our approach on how project risk 
management should be applied to financial IT projects. 
 
3.2. Risk Identification 
 
“I recently realized that I have wasted all my life trying to identify risks and opportunities.” 
Anonymous 
 
The first phase of risk management iteration process is the identification of adverse events which 
can affect our business operations, resources, information, reputation and any kind of 
organizational assets (In this section we do not describe the ways and techniques how to identify 
hazardous event as this task is not addressed in this framework). Every organization has its own 
way to identify risks and opportunities. Instead we show what information must be registered 
along with risk description to make the whole process easily manageable. In financial IT 
projects, not only issues concerning requirements engineering and maintenance request but also 
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direct business operations with partners can originate variety of risky situation. We discuss 
Ericsson Money Services operation as a financial service and some examples concerning it to 
clarify the risk identification phase for the reader comprehensively. 
 
Dependent on what kind of business activities the organization carries on and who the business 
partners are we need to register some standard categories of risk generating environments or 
initiator factors. Ericsson Money Services provides so called mobile wallets for its user to 
transfer their money from one country to another or from place to place by using their mobile 
device. For instance if John wants to transfer money from UK to his friend Kate who lives in 
Japan, he can use his mobile to send money to Kate’s account. Kate can see on her mobile the 
notification that John has sent the money. To realize this operation Ericsson Money Services 
needs to have business partners in both UK and Japan. Usually money transferring operation in 
any country can be done by financial institutions such as banking systems. As the service relies 
on mobile functions Ericsson needs to have telecom operators as partner also. The transferring 
process can be done then by connecting Ericsson’s central transferring system (Ericsson money 
interconnect hub) to local transferring systems of both countries UK and Japan. The banking 
systems and telecom operators who are partnering with Ericsson together are responsible for 
John’s money to be reached to Kate. In this context we can outline generally all the issues, 
problems and agreements that can emerge in this process. For instance the exchange rate 
variation of currencies between Japanese YEN and UK GBP can spontaneously imply a 
question: Who are responsible for this risk? This becomes a matter of agreement between 
partners. Another example can be: Are there any legal issues in these countries while performing 
money transaction? It could be, as legal restrictions on organizations are actual. 
In order to provide a better overview of this phase we identify two potential risks that we use 
also as guidance for the coming phases of the risks management iteration. 
Suppose we have such risks: 
Risk1: Chance of failure of the money transaction between the main Ericsson money 
interconnect HUB and two local service providers of UK and Japan. 
Risk2: Exchange rate variation between YEN and GBP can cause loss of profit for Ericsson. 
The first risk concerns to service providing function reliability which can be weaken because of 
different issues of solution design. If the transaction process fails (John fails to send the money 
to Kate because of system failure) one of the partners is responsible for it. Dependent on what 
the cause of the failure is and the established agreement the responsible for it could be Ericsson, 
the service provider or a partnering company in Japan or UK.  
The second risk, exchange rate variation, endangers the profit of one of the partners. Again 
according to agreement one of them must be responsible for the unpleasant situation. Of course 
while framing risk analysis method for financial IT projects we cannot analyze all the possible 
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adverse events deeply and in detail, because it is effective to identify and mitigate every special 
case separately, (that is why we have periodical risk management process in the programs or 
projects) but we can have some general differentiation of sources and categories of hazardous 
events to simplify the management process and make traceable interdependency between adverse 
events. 
After analysis in the case of Ericsson Money Services we identify the risk differentiating sources 
which can be categorized as following: 
Partner Type:  
Dependent on which kind of financial institution or organization the partner is, the activities, 
roles and emerged issues and risks could be different. In our case we differentiate four types of 
partners. 
 Banking system 
 Telecom operator 
 Retail merchant 
 Other financial institution 
The constitutional issues, the vulnerability of activities and other arisen issues can differ from 
organization to organization and therefore the essence of emerged uncertainties and risks can 
vary widely. 
Standard categories of risks:  
 Solution: Risks that have to do with the solution, the KPIs, data, requirements, testing 
and implementation 
 Fulfillment: Risks that have to do with the service delivery, the acceptance criteria and 
changes 
 Finance and Accounting: Billing terms, cost estimations, discount terms, currency and 
tax implications 
 Security health and environment: Social and cultural aspects, health, product 
responsibilities, personal safety and transportation 
 Commercial: Risks that have to do with the start of the project, the business case, the 
business model, customers and business critical factors 
Financial Operational Sources: 
 Exchange rate variation 
 Currency depreciation 
 Financial crisis 
 Legal restrictions on financial organization 
 Liability issues between partners 
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 Unstable financial partner 
 Governmental severe changes 
 Change or maintenance request 
Country: The name of country from where or to where the money are transferred. 
For different projects these categories and risks can alter or deepen in terms of efficiency. The 
main idea behind registering such information is to have generally outlined historical data while 
dealing with a new partner in a new country. In UniRisk along with all this data we can have a 
place to register some comments and assumptions about specific risks as we find it could be 
supportive for the coming contracts or deals. For instance if we identify that in Japan there are 
some governmental legal restrictions according to which retail merchants cannot perform some 
specific function fully then we can register this information as a useful data for later other 
contracts with a Japanese retail company. There could be some specific risks also that would be 
worth to register. For instance if there is an adverse event that EURO as a currency will 
depreciate dramatically during the money transaction process, implies that the financial 
organization will perform a mitigation activity in order not to be affected severely. In this context 
Ericsson Money Services and the partnering financial institution may come to an agreement on 
how to share the risks and responsibilities (detail discussion in section Risk Response Planning). 
This information is worth to keep as a later compass of resolving similar issues arisen with other 
partnering financial institutions in another country. If we have some beforehand registered 
information about the later country and financial institution type then we can combine it to depict 
the hazardous situation more thoroughly. 
Using as examples Risk1 and Risk2 that we have identified in the beginning of this section, we 
register them by providing all the necessary information. It is worth to mention that for the 
purposes of automation and guidance during the risk identification phase we have listed all the 
possible choices of source, risk category and partner type that are related to risks of financial IT 
projects in the corresponding sheet as a dropdown list. Thus the risk identification and 
registration for Risk1 and Risk2 are: 
Risk1: 
Description and impact: Chance of failure of the money transaction between the main Ericsson 
money interconnect HUB and two local service providers of UK and Japan. 
Partner Type: Banking System 
Category: Financial and Accounting 
Source: Unstable financial partner 
Country: UK and Japan 
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Risk2: 
Description and impact: Exchange rate variation between YEN and GBP can cause loss of profit 
for Ericsson. 
Partner Type: Banking System 
Category: Financial and Accounting 
Source: Exchange rate variation 
Country: UK and Japan 
Having all the risks identified through the identification phase we can now assess and evaluate 
them aiming to get a clear view of what the likelihood of them to occur  is and how much they 
will influence the project in terms of reliability, performance, financial aspects etc. 
 
3.3. Qualitative Assessment of Risks 
 
“We've done a lot of qualitative research to follow up on those findings. It is a trend that bears out.” 
Laurie Demeritt 
 
 
The qualitative assessment of risks is the immediate next phase of the risks identification. During 
this phase the identified risks are investigated in terms of particular descriptive variables. These 
variables are, the relative loss which describes the comparative impact that we have in case that 
the adverse event occurs, the relative probability which refers to the comparative given 
probability of the adverse event occurrence and the relative exposure which is the product of 
relative loss and the relative probability describing the comparative exposure of the risk 
occurrence. Therefore for each risk we estimate the potential relative loss and the relative 
probability of this risk to occur. Afterwards we multiply these two values and the product of 
them is the relative exposure that the project has to that risk: 
                                                      (1) 
In Ericsson they use a range of three values in order to describe the relative loss and probability. 
The variables can take the values from 1 to 3, with 1 being the value that describes the least and 
3 the value that describes the most. The table below provides a sample of results after a 
hypothetical qualitative risks assessment for four different risks. 
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Risk No Relative loss Relative probability Relative exposure 
1 1 1 1 ( Low) 
2 2 3 6 ( High) 
3 2 2 4 (Medium) 
4 2 1 2 ( Low) 
 
Table 2: Sample of qualitative assessment of risks 
The relative exposure of risk shows basically the risk importance. The higher the relative 
exposure is, the more exposed our project to that risk is. In our table for instance is clear that risk 
2 is the most severe and risk 1 the least severe. Usually the relative exposure is presented with 
different colors based on the criticality of the risk in order to highlight the most critical one. The 
relative exposure that has values 1 or 2 is presented with green colour indicating low exposure, 
values 3 and 4  are highlighted with yellow indicating medium exposure and values 6 and 9 with 
red indicating high exposure. Also the relative exposure in some cases is described with text 
corresponding to the product values and can be “low”, “medium” or “high”. The highlight or 
phrasing of the relative exposure aims to provide guidance based on which after the completion 
of this phase we prioritize the risks and we decide which of them will be proceed to further 
quantitative examination as we see in the next section. The number of selected risks for further 
consideration also depends on the type of organization and project, nevertheless the most 
common approach is to take the top ten risks with the greater impact for further examination. 
Although this method seems to be easy to use and apply there are many disadvantages that might 
lead to inaccurate and erroneous results. Firstly this method is based on assumptions and 
therefore cannot be accurate and it is dependent strongly on the experience of the evaluator. 
Secondly each evaluator has to apply this method individually because there is not possibility to 
have an average of all estimates. Another factor that brings barriers to accuracy is that the scale 
of available values to be chosen is limited. In addition this method fits only to stakeholders that 
have experience in project risk management as Ericsson claimed, because not so experienced 
people struggle to provide the related loss and probability using the scale from 1 to 3. Usually all 
the stakeholders know intuitively if the risk is serious to be evaluated quantitatively or not, and 
the application of this step becomes many times redundant. 
In addition this method is missing an important consideration that arises during the project risk 
management iterations. The biggest risks of complex IT projects and particularly financial IT 
projects have to do with economics and the economic impact. The assessment of the economic 
impact of risks along with a method which combines qualitative with quantitative assessment 
which we call “perceptive” is discussed in the section “Perceptive Method”. 
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3.4. Quantitative Assessment of Risks 
 
“You can use all the quantitative data you can get, but you still have to distrust it and use your own intelligence and 
judgment.” 
Alvin Toffler 
 
The quantitative assessment of risks is one of the most demanding phases of the risk 
management iteration and requires significant experience skills and sometimes statistical data. In 
this section we clarify the issues concerning the traditional estimation method of quantitative risk 
analysis. We describe in details the quantitative assessment starting with the analysis of the triple 
estimation method, continuing with the examination of the skewness effect of the loss 
distribution. In the last part we cite a new technique of risk assessment that we call “perceptive” 
which aims to introduce a new approach on how to assign likelihood to specific types of risks 
and combine qualitative and quantitative assessment by transforming words to mathematics. 
 
3.4.1. Triple Estimation Method 
 
In this subsection we describe the quantitative assessment of risks by using the triple estimation 
formula [9] and some issues and inaccuracies concerning to its application.  
When the risk identification and prioritization phase are finished the risk facilitator with all the 
evaluators estimate the expected losses as a result of the potential adverse event. An evaluator 
can be any stakeholder that participates in the risk evaluation process. The base estimation 
method is the three-point estimation technique according to which evaluators are estimating the 
min, most likely and max expected losses. Usually the [min, max] interval is given with 99 
percent confidence level, which means that the likelihood of real loss is out of that interval is 
estimated to be only one percent. The min of estimated minimums is taken as the lowest value of 
expected loss. For instance if we have four estimators and they provide such values for min, [0, 
10, 10, 8], then we are taking the minimum of all estimates, which in this case is 0. The principle 
is the same with choosing most likely and max estimates. Most likely value is the average of all 
estimated most likely values and the max is the maximum of all estimated max values. Whenever 
we have all the estimates we can calculate the min, max and most likely values. The table below 
visualizes our example: 
 Min (TSEK) Most likely (TSEK) Max (TSEK) 
Estimator 1 0 50 120 
Estimator 2 10 50 130 
Estimator 3 10 65 160 
Estimator 4 8 65 120 
Estimate 0 57.5 160 
 
Table 3: Sample of quantitative assessment of risks 
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Having these results, we can apply the triple estimation formula by evaluating the expected min, 
most likely and max losses to calculate the average expected losses (mean value). Generally the 
mean value is the mathematical expectation of the loss distribution. In triple estimation formula 
it is defined as the weighted average of three (min, most likely, max) estimated values: 
      
                     
   
    (2) 
Here   is the weight of most likely value. In different practical situations the value of   is 
different. For instance in estimating the lines of code of the software that must be implemented, 
weight is assigned     [16]. In estimating preliminary cost it is usually     or in some 
special cases       [9]. In Ericsson Money Services they use       value: 
    
                       
   
                                (3) 
Thus using this value for our example we get: 
      
              
   
       
Besides the estimated average loss we also need to calculate the dispersion which is another 
indicator of risk exposure. The greater the dispersion of estimated values from mean is, the more 
uncertain the adverse event is and its consequences. The dispersion can be expressed by standard 
deviation (D), the simplified calculation of which is: 
                                                     
       
    
  [9]    (4) 
If we calculate standard deviation by this formula for our example we get: 
      
     
    
       
Usually when we assess the severeness of a risk we take into account those two major indicators, 
the average loss (M) and dispersion (D). Nevertheless there are other important factors that we 
must not neglect such as the risk tolerance of the organization, the volatility of hazardous event 
(described in “Monitoring and Control” section), the type of loss distribution and so on. 
Despite the simplicity of the triple estimation formula while assessing the risks we have some 
serious issues regarding the type of loss distribution. Usually the density function indicates the 
type of the curve that the loss as a random variable is distributed. In here the loss distribution is 
confined with the interval of min and max values, is discrete and expressed in terms of money. 
Generally in assessing risks and using the triple estimation formula we use the Erlang 
distribution. The probability function of which is given as: 
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                              (5) 
  is the rate parameter and   is the shape parameter. [4] 
The experience shows that in most of the hazardous situations the estimated losses fitted to an 
Erlang distribution can reflect the real losses when we use formula (3). Notwithstanding, there 
are some specific cases when the loss distribution is significantly different from Erlang 
distribution and has noticeable skewness. 
 In the next subsection we focus on the issue when the real loss distribution is significantly 
different from the Erlang type. We show that in such cases we must carefully examine the risky 
event and choose a different value for the weight of most likely value to avoid erroneous 
estimations and compensate the distribution skewness effect on formula (2). 
 
3.4.2. Skewness Effect on Mean Value 
 
“Creativity is the ability to introduce order into the randomness of nature” 
Eric Hoffer 
 
As we have described in the previous subsection in most cases we can adapt the Erlang 
distribution to resemble the real distribution of losses. But the term real distribution is also 
conditional because we do not have the same statistical population to assess what type of curve 
we have. However the experience of a number of scholars and practitioners shows that Erlang 
distribution can be successfully applied in the software development industry while assessing 
preliminary costs and risks [4]. Nonetheless there are some special cases when the use of Erlang 
distribution brings some significant divergences of evaluated mean value from real mean value 
of the distribution. The result can exacerbate dramatically when the distribution curve has 
absolute skewness, that is, either left or right tail of the distribution curve is missing (Figure 3). 
In such cases a risk manager must ponder for the use of the triple estimation formula: 
 
     
                     
 
    (6) 
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Figure 3: Probability - Loss distribution curve without left tail 
As Professor Steen Lichtenberg describes [9], if the real distribution is quite close to Erlang then 
the magnitude of the error is not conspicuous and does not put a risk facilitator in a plight. 
Practice shows that those kinds of errors are much less than the errors emerged from bad 
estimates and insufficient decomposition of complex task for estimation. However it is not 
unimportant and we should be careful while assessing the actual risk. Much complicated and 
competitive task is when it is difficult to decide which kind of distribution we deal with. We 
know that mostly we can fit it to Erlang but dependent on uniqueness of the risk and uncertainty 
parameters, the distribution type can be quite far from Erlang type.  
Whenever we have symmetric distribution we do not pay attention what the distribution type is 
because anyway the triple estimation formula is not affected at all. In such cases the mean value 
(M) coincides with most likely value. To describe with statistical terms, the mode and median of 
the curve are the same. For instance if we have 10, 40 and 70 values for 
                      values conformably, then the mean equals  
          
 
   . 
The picture is the same if we change the weight of the most likely value and take some arbitrary 
value. For instance if in formula (2) we substitute     weight by       and so         
instead of denominator 5 the result remains the same, 40 as we see in  Figure 4. 
This effect can be generalized as follows: Any type of distribution that is symmetric to   
       line, the median, estimated most likely and mean values coincide, and triple estimation 
formula is applicable effectively. 
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Figure 4: Symmetric Probability – Loss distribution curves 
As the difference between                                       is getting greater, the 
distribution type is getting more important. The reason is that the weight of the most likely value 
is varying. As we have mentioned earlier when we have Erlang distribution the formula (2) is 
still applicable in most cases (some exceptions can happen due to change of shape and rate 
parameters of the Erlang distribution [4] especially when most likely value is equal to either max 
or min values), but when the distribution is more convex or more incurved then the weight of the 
most likely value must be changed in the formula (2). 
In practical situations there are some cases, that likeliness of estimated max value and some 
closer values to it are still not as possible as the most likely value but have significant probability. 
For instance, if we park our car outside on the street, then there is likelihood that the car will be 
stolen in the night. The maximum estimated loss is our car price. But most likely the car will not 
be stolen. Now if we change our mind and park our car in the parking lot there is still likelihood 
that the car will be stolen. It is possible but much less probable than in the first case, as it is 
under the surveillance of the guard.  Despite of the same min, most likely and max estimated loss 
the average estimated loss is different. The reason is the likeliness of the most likely and max 
estimated losses differs. In this example we have a kind of “either-or” type of event and the 
reader may think we do not have distribution curve at all, only two possible cases – either car is 
stolen or not. But if we imagine that there is a public disorder in the street and they can harm the 
car, then we have a loss distribution as they might cause some damage which can be expressed in 
terms of money. They can break down the car windows, damage the metal, burn it and so on. All 
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those damages can be expressed in terms of money. On the loss distribution we have     
                                 (            loss can be some other value also). In 
this simplified example we can see that the min, max and most likely values are the same, but we 
feel safer to pay some money and park the car in the parking lot as inside parking lot the most 
likely estimate is more trustworthy to happen than outside of it. This fact can be expressed 
statistically by changing the distribution curve. 
 
 
Figure 5: Car example: Probability – Loss distribution curve 
In Figure 5 the blue curve expresses the state of the car in the parking lot and the green curve for 
outside correspondingly. This effect is also very interestingly expressed by the surface of the 
curves confined with the axis of loss. We know that cumulative distribution function can be 
presented also with the surface of the area confined by probability density function and axis of 
losses as a random variable and it must be equal to 1 from the condition that cumulative 
distribution function is the integral of the density function. Now if we compare the surfaces of 
the curves we notice that even with the same min, max and most likely values, when we park our 
car in the parking lot some part of the density function’s surface is moving to left thus reducing 
the overall exposure. In Figure 3 the initial surface is green which after mitigation and 
distribution changes moving to blue side thus showing that the most likely and some closer 
values are getting more probable reducing the probability of the max value and some closer 
values of it. 
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Figure 6: Triangular Probability – Loss distribution 
Examining the risky situations that can arise in financial IT projects such as Ericsson Money 
Services we found that the upper observed issues are largely possible. Possible project 
fulfillment delay and the penalties because of it can be a good example. This and other type of 
risks sometimes cannot be described with Erlang distribution. In such cases when we have more 
convex (usually before mitigation) and more incurved (usually when we mitigate and evaluate 
the possible losses again) distributions, we must find other type of distribution to describe loss 
distribution.  
As a special type of any other convex distribution the triangular distribution can be applied 
emanating from the simplicity of the distribution parameters [4][5]. Comparison of distribution 
parameters, particularly the mean value can give some valuable results. The mean value (M), 
which is the median for triangular distribution (*), is: 
            
 
 
      
                           
 
               
       
 
     
                           
 
                
       
 
     (7) 
 
 
*In statistics the mean value or expectation value is sometimes referred as the arithmetical mean of the set of values 
and sometimes the weighted mean. Median is the point where the total surface of the density function curve is 
equally shared. This express the fact, that the probability that the random variable will drop in the left side of the 
median equals the probability that the random variable will drop in the right side of median. When we refer mean 
value in the triple estimation formula we mean the median of the distribution. 
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For example if we have such estimations 
                              
Then the estimated mean value by triple estimation is: 
  
           
 
    
Now if we count the mean value by using the formula (7) we get: 
       
                
 
      
As we see the two results differ. The real mean value is less than the value counted by triple 
estimation formula. The divergence reaches to its worst case when we have most likely value 
equal either to min or max values. For instance: 
                              
  
           
 
    
        
                
 
    
As we see the difference between        now is significant. The further the most likely value 
is from the median of the distribution the greater the divergence between          . When the 
most likely value is closer to min value (right skew) then    , when most likely value is 
closer to max (left skew) value then     . The worst case is when most likely equals either to 
min or max. In case of the symmetric distribution the triangle becomes isosceles and those values 
become equal. 
In such cases when we have more convex distribution than the Erlang distribution is, particularly 
triangular, we need to reduce the weight of the most likely value in the formula (2). For instance 
if in previous example we substitute the weight of the most likely value     with       then 
we get: 
  
             
   
    
This approximation is quite close to      value, which can be regarded as a good estimate.  
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Unfortunately neither the distribution type nor the skewness effect can be defined precisely for a 
specific risk and nowadays there is not any generalized approach to apply but it does not imply 
that their effect on estimation must be disregarded. On the contrary, these effects sometimes are 
very visible depending on a specific situation and can be reduced significantly. 
In the example of the parking we noticed that whenever the car is in the parking lot the max 
estimated loss is still the price of the car, but it is not worryingly probable. In such cases when 
the most likely value and some closer interval to it is much more likely than the values situated 
close to the edges of the interval, can be called more incurved than the Erlang distribution. The 
Gumbel [11] or skew-Laplace [1] distributions can serve to describe the probabilistic behavior of 
losses in these situations. Sometimes in a specific situations when min and most likely estimates 
are the same the exponential distribution can also serve us as it is a simplified version of Laplace 
distribution [4] (when we remove the location parameter from the later one). 
 
 
Figure 7: Exponential Probability – Loss distribution 
In practice to adapt losses to one of those distributions is a difficult task because of the 
exponential form of the skew-Laplace, double exponential form of the Gumbel and adjusting 
min, most likely and max values with scale and location parameters and specifying confidence 
level interval. These issues are not addressed in our work. But we discuss one example of 
exponential distribution to show that the skewness effect has contrary effect compared with 
triangular distribution. In the parking example when the car is in the parking lot and safe, the re-
estimated losses can be presented with exponential curve as the most likely and min values are 
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much more probable than max or some closer values. The probability density function of 
exponential curve when we have   random (in our case losses) variable is: 
          
       
     
    (8) 
    is the rate parameter of the distribution [4]. 
Specifying a value for λ, for instance, λ=1, we get such results: 
             
                
                 
                
                  
                 
Observing the results we can easily conform that those can quite closely approximate the real 
loss distribution because the probability of no damage (min, most likely values) is very high and 
it dramatically diminishes when the estimated losses are approaching to car price. At the point of 
5 TSEK which is the car price we have 0.007 probability of loss: An estimate that ensures a bit 
more than 99% confidence level (apparently in this example we cannot lose more than our car 
but in a program, while estimating potential risk exposure, the likeliness of greater losses are 
possible, which are out of 99% confidence level and thus disregarded). Now if we compare the 
mean value, calculated by the triple estimation formula (M), and median of the exponential curve 
(Me), we can see the differences. 
  
       
 
        
The median of the exponential distribution is: 
                         
This difference is visualized in Figure 7. The real risk exposure value is 0.693 TSEK whereas 
with triple estimation formula we have 1 TSEK. 
And again if we chose a different weight for most likely value, say        , we will have: 
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With k=5.2 weight of most likely value  and M values are almost equal.  
In different situations and for different type of risks the distribution curve can change its shape 
widely. Our research shows that those changes are most crucial on triple estimation technique 
when we have sharply emphasized skewness of the distribution. The skewness effect reaches its 
highest magnitude when the most likely estimated loss is equal to either min or max values. 
Depending on which side of the distribution is the skew and what type of distribution is the 
relationship of real mean value (median) and mean value of triple estimation interrelate the 
following way: 
 Left skew and more incurved than Erlang – M<Mreal 
 Left skew and more convex than Erlang – M>Mreal 
 Right skew and more incurved than Erlang – M>Mreal 
 Right skew and more convex than Erlang – M< Mreal 
 
The examined examples and calculations of mean value according to different known 
distribution curves showed us that the weight of the most likely value can change in 1.5 to 5 
interval (even in greater interval in some critical cases are possible). 
 
We also noticed that choosing the distribution curve to resemble the real hazardous situation is 
not an easy task but it is undoubtedly possible if we examine that situation profoundly 
(comparing likeliness of different estimated losses by our inner perception and specifying the 
distribution curve or the weight of most likely value). 
We must always remember that mathematical equations and geometrical forms (such as 
distribution curves) are a unique type of language created for resembling the natural phenomena. 
In reality the essence and the behavior of the event is always different [14]. The trick is to 
understand when and how we can apply already discovered shapes and formulas to overcome our 
specific problem. The more we are aware of statistical data, current condition of reality and how 
they are interrelated the more precise we will be in our predictions. In order to success on this we 
would better to set us free from our desires, delusions, pessimism, conditionalized manners, 
business values and other hampering feelings and possessions, set our mind free from biased, 
preconceived and disposed attitude to the event and evaluate consciously and freely. 
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3.4.3. Perceptive Method 
 
“When you can measure what you are speaking about, and express it in numbers, you know something about it; 
but when you cannot express it in numbers, your knowledge is of a meager and unsatisfactory kind;”  
Lord K Elvin 
Widely speaking about risk management in practice we often encounter a situation when the 
expectance of adverse event has two possible outcomes – either occurrence or not occurrence. To 
clarify this statement we can compare the example Risk 2 discussed in section 3.2 and the 
example of possible stealing the car discussed in subsection 3.4.2. For instance when we know 
that the possible exchange rate variation between YEN and GBP may threaten the expected 
profit of Ericsson Money Services we must estimate not only if the exchange rate variation may 
occur but also how much the magnitude is of the variation. The loss of profit is highly dependent 
of the magnitude of variation. Conversely in the second example when we park our car outside 
then we have the odds to lose our car or not as it either can be stolen or not in the night. There 
are two possible outcomes of this risk and the magnitude of the loss is the same as the car price. 
The similar risky situation is, for instance, paying penalties because of delayed delivery of a 
software product. When there is a fixed date for delivering a product the possible delay costs 
certain amount of money and depending if the product is delayed or not the organization ought to 
either pay or to not to pay the penalties. These kind of risks are usually called “either-or” because 
of theirs two possible outcomes. As we discussed in subsection 3.4.1 the estimation of these risks 
by triple estimation method can bring erroneous results because of skewness effect of loss 
distribution. When we have two possible expected outcomes of adverse event the estimated most 
likely value of the risk is equal to either min or max values. We cannot disdain the effect of 
skewness especially when we have two possible values of occurrence as we have shown in 
subsection 3.4.2. In such cases the triple estimation formula can only be used when we know 
with a sufficient approximation of what type the loss distribution is. 
The traditional way of risk assessment is to estimate the probability of the occurrence of adverse 
event, the impact of it in terms of cost and multiply these two values in order to get the exposure of 
a particular risk: 
                              (9) 
P – Probability 
I – Impact or Loss in terms of cost 
E – Risk Exposure which shows average loss in terms of cost 
Despite the endeavor of the estimators some practitioners mention that it is very hard to estimate 
the probability of an event occurrence when we do not have the same statistical population. The 
main problem is that the estimators cannot see clearly the likeliness of the event behind a 
40 | P a g e  
number. For instance when we ask an expert how much the probability that the actual costs of 
the system maintenance will exceed the foreseen cost by 25% is he may face difficulties to put 
his perception of likeliness of that event into a number such as 0.3 in a scale from 0 to 1. Usually 
in real life situations while assessing any uncertainty we estimate the probability with natural 
language such as “possibly”, “may be”, “certainly” and so on. But on the other hand in order to 
be able to estimate quantitatively we need a number for probability to multiply with expected 
losses. Whenever we are asked to estimated the probability of the occurrence of an event it is 
assumed that we have some statistical population behind it from which we can derive a number. 
But as we know and the experience of Ericsson shows in some cases it is very time consuming to 
collect the possible statistical data and frame it, or even in most cases we do not have relevant 
statistical data at all. Particularly in software projects’ risk management when it comes to 
quantitative assessment of risks some practitioners assess the emerged risks qualitatively or in 
some cases they apply the triple estimation formula as it is proven to be consistent and 
trustworthy [2].  
 
The idea of creating the perceptive method is to have a standard technique which can simply and 
effectively deal with “either - or” types of risks by applying probabilistic estimation in order to 
avoid both the skewness effect of the loss distribution, while assessing by triple estimation 
formula, and the difficulties of the estimators, while they are required to give a certain 
probability of the adverse event’s occurrence. This method is based on human experience and 
inner perception of the reality which does not necessarily rely on how many similar events we 
have experienced heretofore but the ability to analyze and deduce results from any possible data 
that is available in human mind and has a connection somehow with the expected event. For 
instance if we are asked to evaluate how much the likelihood is that tomorrow will rain we do 
not count all the days during the year that was rainy and divide on the number of days of the 
year. We usually look up to the sky trying to understand the humidity of the air, if there are 
clouds or not, if it is windy or not, compare with newspaper prediction and we eventually say – 
“doubtfully”. All our knowledge, experience and ability of deduction come and concentrate in 
this single word which expresses our inner perception of the reality by analyzing not only the 
statistical data about the fact (we are in England and so it must be rainy by probability of 0.7), 
but also all the current condition of the reality and its tendency to the next stage of the time. If 
we were, for instance, people of ten thousand years ago we definitely would have difficulties by 
judging based on windiness or humidity and no newspaper would be available, but now, when all 
the information has transferred to us how to make decision based on all this data we are able to 
assess the reality much better. Thus the competence of the method relies on the human 
experience that has been accumulated during ages and does not imply having the same statistical 
population to estimate the likeliness of the event. 
As we know the natural language is one of the most powerful tools to share our knowledge and 
have common sense with other people on how the reality behaves. When we are asked the 
question “do you think it will rain tomorrow?” and we answered “doubtfully” it is common 
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knowledge between asker and interlocutor and it is perceived as “I have no obvious reason to be 
believe it or not but I have slight knowledge by judging the situation and I believe that the 
tendency of the reality is slightly prone to not having rain tomorrow”. This is kind of explanation 
of the word “doubtfully” that we have perceived and articulated.  
Based on this judgment and analyzing more than 200 adverbs, adjectives and combinations in 
English, examining the most popular dictionaries of English and discussing with philologists we 
have chosen the most suitable and appropriate words to express the likelihood of expected event 
that is understandable enough for the estimators and practitioners. Meanwhile we have chosen 
the likelihood expressing adverbs and adjectives in a way that it allows us to assign the 
corresponding probabilities to these words in terms of numbers in a good enough approximation. 
The reasons of this idea are to assess the likelihood of the event in natural language, that is easier 
and understandable for people and to have quantitative results in the end, to be able to assess the 
expected exposure of risk quantitatively. 
Below we focus on the delineation of the chosen words and theirs probabilities one by one 
reasoning the rationale of adopting it: 
The upper and lower boundaries of the likelihood are the 98 % and 2% of the chance of event’s 
occurrence. These numbers show that the evaluator has several facts that strongly imply the 
occurrence or not occurrence of an event and there is no visible reason to think otherwise. But as 
the event is probabilistic and the condition of reality can be changed for unknown reasons the 
evaluator does not give 100% or 0% chance of occurrence. For this likelihood we denote the 
following combinations: 
                      
                          
When we say that an event is almost certain that will happen we do not have doubt but we know 
that the event is probabilistic and there is a slight possibility that an unexpected hap can change 
the conditions. 
One step lower than “Almost certain” and one step above than “Almost impossible” we use:  
                    
                      
When we say that the event is highly likely to happen then we believe that there is strong 
evidence from all the possible facts and observations that it will happen but at the same time 
there are some very little but visible factors that might prevent the occurrence of it. Sometimes 
depending on the situation, our profession, our attitude to the reality or the way of perceiving the 
reality we use some other alternative words instead of “highly likely” such as “evidently”, 
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“obviously”, “apparently”, “manifestly” and so on. All these mentioned words are anyhow 
dependent on how we have perceived the necessary information to make a decision. For instance 
the word “evidently” is mainly based on the not subjective, common observation and 
alternatively the word “apparently” is based on the visual subjective observation. In both cases 
the occurrence of event can be considered as quite probable but the word combination “highly 
likely” does not imply how is the information observed or perceived it just state the fact the 
something is highly likely to happen and other all the detail deductions are hidden in the 
evaluators head. The same way we can use “hardly ever” or “rarely” instead of “highly 
unlikely”. Especially the adverb “hardly ever” can substitute successfully the combination 
“highly unlikely” but for the cohesion of the list we choose the later one. 
Less probable than “highly likely” and more probable than “highly unlikely” we denote the 
following adverbs: 
                
                  
These two words we use frequently in daily speech. Whenever we express our attitude to the 
event that something “probably” will happen (not something is probable to happen) we give 
about 75% chance that it will happen. In dictionaries mostly the meaning of this word is 
described as to be quite positive to the event that it will happen but not sure of it. The adverb 
“improbably” quite closely approximate the converse likeliness of the “probably” which means 
that when we say an event improbably will happen we mean that there is approximately 25% 
chance to happen. 
As less probable adverb than “probably” and more probable word than “improbably” we have 
conformably:  
                
                  
The word “possibly” has a special power to indicate that we do not have any obvious reason for 
believing that an event will happen but there are some hidden or not evidential reasons and that 
makes us to preconceive that the event is disposed to happen. The same way when we say 
“doubtfully”, we do not have any visible evidential superposition of facts to deduce a stronger 
attitude of acceptance or rejection of event occurrence, but we still believe that we perceive some 
indirect information from the reality that says the event is more possible not to happen rather 
than happen. In this condition we clearly believe that odds are not equal. In some cases we use 
“maybe” instead of “possibly” which shows slightly lower chance for event occurrence than the 
adverb “possibly”. 
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And eventually we have the position that we do not have any information about the system and 
we are completely unaware what can happen. The likelihood of this can be assigned as: 
                
Usually the more the facts, evidence, observations are and the less the misleading knowledge is 
about the reality, the stronger our belief is about event’s occurrence. In Information Theory when 
we do not have any information about a system it means the entropy of the system is the highest 
and the probability of occurrence of an event in the system is regarded 0.5. Therefore there can 
be two possibilities, either we need to observe further and have considerably more information to 
assess the likelihood better or we believe that it is not possible to have any evidence about the 
system or the situation and we estimate the probability as fifty/fifty. This is a common term that 
we always use in our daily life which means that we do not have any obvious information to be 
slightly disposed to positive or negative answer to the happening of the event. After these 
denotations we have the full list of the probabilities and their assigned values as we present in the 
table below: 
Likelihood by Natural language Likelihood by numbers 
Almost certain 0.98 
Highly likely 0.86 
Probably 0.74 
Possibly 0.62 
Fifty/fifty 0.50 
Doubtfully 0.38 
Improbably 0.26 
Highly unlikely 0.14 
Almost impossible 0.02 
 
Table 4: Perceptive key words and assigned probabilities 
All these nine words and their assigned probability values allow us to express our perception of 
likeliness of an event’s occurrence and transfer that perception to a number in order to evaluate 
the likelihood quantitatively. In other words we express our attitude by human language and 
convert it to the language that the nature speaks. We have chosen the words in a way that does 
not have multiple meanings or too wide range for expressing likeliness which can cause 
erroneous results. A supportive condition is that the user must express his/her perception of 
likeliness having all these words in front of him/her so it will be easy to understand more 
precisely the meanings. However we strongly believe that during the evaluation the users should 
not see the numbers with these words and it must be hidden until the evaluation process is 
finished and we need to count the average of the results. We advise that the estimators should not 
think too much about the word and about how much the assigned number is. They must choose 
spontaneously the word that is the closest characterizing likelihood of the event.   
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Below we cite a clarifying example of the method: 
Suppose we have four evaluators and they must predict the likelihood of the event whether 
tomorrow will rain or not. Every evaluator expresses his/her belief using the perceptive method 
(Table 5). 
Evaluator name Likelihood 
Evaluator 1 Doubtfully 
Evaluator 2 Doubtfully 
Evaluator 3 50-50 
Evaluator 4 Improbably 
 
Table 5: Evaluators estimations based on perceptive method on the raining example 
After the evaluation we can assign the corresponding values and calculate the mean value by 
calculating the sum of four assessments and dividing by the number of evaluators (Table 6): 
Evaluator name Likelihood Likelihood  
Evaluator 1 Doubtfully 0.38 
Evaluator 2 Doubtfully 0.38 
Evaluator 3 50-50 0.5 
Evaluator 4 Improbably 0.26 
Average  0.38 
 
Table 6: Assigned likelihood value based on the estimations of the raining example 
The average likelihood is 0.38. 
For assessing the risk exposure we need to calculate the average likelihood, the average loss and 
then multiply these two values. Suppose we are a software project development team and if we 
delay to deliver the product from the promised day we have to pay penalties. Table 7 presents the 
results of the evaluation. 
Evaluator name Likelihood Likelihood Impact SEK Exposure SEK 
Evaluator 1 Improbably 0.26 500000  
Evaluator 2 Highly unlikely 0.14 500000  
Evaluator 3 Almost Impossible 0.02 500000  
Evaluator 4 Almost Impossible 0.02 500000  
Average  0.11 500000 55000 
 
Table 7: Product delivery risk example using perceptive method 
As we see the cost of penalty has fixed value and the only variable is the likelihood. This is also 
one of the special features of this method as it allows decomposing the likelihood and impact and 
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estimating separately as a contrast to the triple estimation method. When we have fixed value of 
loss in case of adverse event occurrence this method becomes more consistent.  
In a common situation when the impact of risk is not fixed value it is useful to calculate the most 
probable interval of losses. To explain this concept, suppose we have the following situation: 
The Solution Design Program of Ericsson aims to develop a new mobile service in a fixed 
timeframe of one year. At the same time there is an expected reorganization in Ericsson which 
can have severe impact on the program if they do not finish the development and release of white 
label before the reorganization processes are begun. Suppose six evaluators are designated to 
estimate the exposure of risk in case of the product development is not finished before the 
reorganization. The table below visualizes the results:   
Evaluator name Likelihood Likelihood Impact SEK Exposure SEK 
Evaluator 1 Possibly 0.62 500000  
Evaluator 2 Probably 0.74 700000  
Evaluator 3 Probably 0.74 450000  
Evaluator 4 Highly likely 0.86 500000  
Evaluator 5 Probably 0.74 600000  
Evaluator 6 Possibly 0.62 800000  
Average  0.72 591666 426000 
Min  0.62 450000 279000 
Max  0.86 800000 688000 
 
Table 8: Solution Design Program example using perceptive method 
The minimal exposure is calculated as the minimal estimated likelihood multiplied by minimal 
estimated impact among all estimates. The same way we calculate the maximum exposure. The 
interval of [min exposure, max exposure] we call the most probable interval of losses. For our 
example it is [279000, 688000]. The greater the interval is the more unpredictable the risk is 
irrespective of the average exposure. 
In this method the usage of words is tightly chained with how cognizant the user is about its 
meaning in the evaluation context. In different geographical areas different people can use the 
same word with some divergence of the meaning and this can become a hindrance of its 
application. Nonetheless the words are chosen in a way that it reduces this effect maximally and 
we provide self-explanatory texts with every word as an augment or supportive function. To use 
the method it is worth to have a compendium of our self-explanatory texts with every keyword in 
the list that we propose in this framework. In case the user does not feel comfortable with a 
certain word he/she can read about the word explanation in terms of expressing likelihood. The 
application of the method is experimentalized with both experts and non experts in different 
fields for estimation the probability of variety of events and consolidated to be easy graspable. 
Before applying in real-life problems as a new method it must be epistemologically consistent to 
distinguish the justified belief from subjectiveness. To be so we propose to apply it parallel with 
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the other well known risk management methods and adverse events’ outcomes and collate results 
later in order to judge about the competence of the method. 
The disparity between real likelihood and assessed likelihood is estimated not to be considerably 
big in project risk management as the natural language supports at least nine or ten words in 
probability [0, 1] interval. The worst case of the divergence between real likelihood and assessed 
one is estimated to be 6% of overall estimated cost while calculating risk exposure value. When 
we feel that we want to assign a different probability than the proposed nine key-words, for 
instance, something between “probably” and “highly likely” we are not able to do it directly and 
perhaps in most cases we do not need to do, because the numerical difference between this two 
words are 0.12. The worst case of divergence arises when we strongly believe that we assess the 
probability of event as between “highly likely” and “probably” which is just the midpoint of 0.74 
and 0.86 and equals to 0.8. In this case we have 0.06 unit divergence and that comes to 6% of the 
estimated loss. If we have safety critical systems we never accept this value but we also know 
that in such systems other methods are used [3] [8]. In projects risk management when we 
usually evaluate the expected losses in terms of money by triple estimation method, traditionally 
or even qualitatively we usually accept greater interval of divergences. In case of triple 
estimation method this divergence emerges because of the loss distribution skewness effect or 
when we apply traditional method we estimate the probability by giving just a number that is 
mostly hardly graspable for the evaluators. Sometimes we even do not give a numerical value in 
case of qualitative assessment. The perceptive method somewhat combines the quantitative and 
qualitative assessment of risk as we express our perception of reality by natural language and 
later transfer it to the language of mathematics. 
The congruence between words and likelihood and the appropriateness of theirs usage is adjusted 
by discussing it with the philologists, other experts and using the most trustworthy dictionaries 
(Collins and Oxford). 
In the coming section we focus on the different types of strategies that can be planned when the 
risk is identified, assessed and we need to deal with it.  
 
3.5. Risk Response Planning 
 
“It is sometimes an appropriate response to reality to go insane”   
  Philip. K. Dick 
 
Once a risk has been identified and evaluated, a response plan has to be specified in order to 
reduce or prevent the expected loss of that particular risk. In risk management the risk response 
planning is expressed as a mitigation activity. Mitigation activity is the action that we perform in 
order to relieve our properties and goals from a risk partly or completely. The mitigation 
activity can follow a certain strategy which is called mitigation strategy. A mitigation strategy is 
a conceptually specific approach to deal with emerged risks. In this section we cite the different 
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types of mitigation strategies and we discuss the different cases of response that each mitigation 
strategy applies. 
Risk management is very flexible in terms of risk response planning due to the variety of 
available options in terms of mitigation activities. As every risk has its uniqueness and particular 
characteristics it can be faced in different ways such as acceptance, reduction or transfer. The 
mitigation activities are dependent on the characteristics and source of the risk, different 
resources and tools, the urgency of dealing with the risk and to who is responsible to deal with it. 
A mitigation activity can consist of different mitigation strategies which are the mitigation 
alternatives as we discuss in the coming section of risk analysis. Ericsson as well as most of the 
software organizations uses five different mitigation strategies which are the most common ones 
in the field of risk management [12]. Taking into account the fact that financial IT projects have 
more unstable parameters of risks and involve different business partners during the project 
development and the whole project life cycle, our approach to risk response planning contains 
seven different mitigation strategies. These seven mitigation strategies we describe below in 
combination with a simple life time scenario. 
 Risk acceptance: In this case we accept the existence of the risk and we either ignore or 
accept the possible loss. For instance, we want to have picnic outside tomorrow but this night 
it is snowing and the weather forecast is not encouraging at all for tomorrow. Despite the 
discouraging weather condition we contemplate and decide to go for the picnic. 
 
 Risk avoidance: It determines that we perform the necessary activities to avoid the risk 
occurrence. We modify the initial plans to cancel risky decisions or remove risky elements. 
For instance we know that there are sharks in a specific beach and therefore in order to keep 
ourselves in the safe side we do not go to swim there. 
 Risk reduction: It describes the performance of specific activities to reduce the probability 
and impact of the risk to occur. For instance we have a tough exam next week and if we do 
not study hard there is a high probability to fail and moreover, to extend our studies till the 
retake date in August and therefore we may postpone our graduation and spend more money 
for rent. Therefore to reduce the risk’s probability we decide to study hard for the whole 
week till the exam. 
 Risk mitigation: We perform the necessary activities to eliminate completely the likeliness 
and loss of a risk. For instance suppose there is a probability that if we do not water the 
plants in our balcony while we are on vacation they will fade out and we have to spend 
money to plant new ones. Therefore we ask the neighbour to come ones and take care of 
them until we are back from vacation. 
 Risk transfer: In this case we transfer the risk to another person or organization by signing a 
contract or buy insurance. In most of the IT projects the risk transfer is achieved by buying 
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an insurance to determine that someone else will deal successfully with our risk. For 
instance, thieves got inside our house during the vacation period and they stole belongings 
that cost 40.000 SEK. Nevertheless, because we wanted to avoid risks of such situations we 
have bought insurance for our house and belongings. Hence the insurance company has to 
pay us back 40.000 SEK. The risk transfer response is very common in financial IT projects 
where different operators are responsible for the normal operation of the system.  
 
 Risk coordinate: In this case both the two parties co-operate in order to deal with a risk. It is 
possible in financial IT projects that both the developing house and the financial institute 
work together mainly by establishing an organization in between in order to carry on the 
necessary activities and deal with risks. A common risk of the developing house and the 
financial institute is agreed to be mitigated by the co-operation of the two. 
 
 Risk overlook: In this case we identify inceptive events of risk but we do not plan any 
mitigation strategy and we simply examine the risk inceptive event against factors that can 
influence it. When we see that the hazardous situation becomes critical and needs mitigation 
then we plan which mitigation strategy to apply to deal with this particular risk. 
 
Having all the possible responses to risks outlined above we recall the identified risks that we 
have defined at the identification section (Risk1 and Risk2) and we use them as example in order 
to plan a response. Both the two risks belong to Ericsson Money Services and by extension to 
Ericsson. Therefore Ericsson has to plan the proper response for each of risks. The two coming 
paragraphs describe the risk response plan for each of the two risks individually. 
Risk one (Risk1) describes a situation where there might be a possible failure during the 
transactions between the central HUB of Ericsson Money Services and the two local ones in UK 
and Japan. A possible occurrence of this risk harms the reliability of the service and the normal 
operation of it. For the sake of reliability and normal operation of the service Ericsson plans to 
deal fully with this risk and applies the risk mitigation strategy. According to the risk mitigation 
strategy, Ericsson takes all the needed actions in order to eliminate completely the probability 
and loss of this risk and ensure the normal transaction of money between the HUBs. 
The second risk (Risk2) describes a situation during which the exchange rate variation of YEN 
against GBP can cause loss of money of Ericsson. As we have discussed previously Ericsson 
Money Services is the first financial IT project of Ericsson and therefore Ericsson has no 
experience and is not able to deal with financial risks. In order to deal successfully with this risk 
Ericsson transfers the risk to a co-operative financial institute. This response strategy by Ericsson 
is defined as risk transfer. Ericsson negotiates with the partnering financial institution and 
establishes a contract to transfer the risk to the financial institute. Thus the financial institute is 
responsible to take all the needed actions in order to secure the profit of Ericsson through a 
transaction despite the changes of the currency exchange rate. Knowing that the currency 
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exchange rate between YEN and GBP can cause loss of money for Ericsson, they decide to 
interchange the profit of Ericsson in EURO. This response by the financial institute is called risk 
avoidance, because the financial institute decided to remove the risky elements which in this case 
are the exchange rate variation between YEN and GBP. The example was a simple presentation 
of how two organizations can negotiate and deal with a risk. In reality this process can be much 
more complicated and multi-action. 
A risk response plan can be handled by combination of more than one different mitigation 
strategies as we have seen at the case of Risk2. Ericsson transfers the risk to the financial 
institute and after the risk is avoided by the financial institute. It is worth to mention that 
whichever mitigation strategy we apply to a particular risk, that risk has to be reported during the 
risk management iteration in order to be monitored and controlled and also track the risk’s 
volatility as we see in the coming section. In the case that Ericsson has transferred the risk to the 
financial institute, the risk has to be reported within Ericsson and the financial institute has to 
inform Ericsson about the mitigation strategy that it applies to the risk and the performance of it. 
Important factors that influence the activity of risk response planning and therefore the choice of 
mitigation strategy are the budget and the time planning of each project. Mitigation strategies can 
be judged as sufficient or insufficient depending on their cost and duration. Therefore a 
mitigation strategy that requires a significant budget and the duration of which exceeds the 
specified time frame is reasonable to be rejected.  Apart from the correct selection of mitigation 
strategy it is important to be able to control and monitor the mitigation strategy in order to secure 
the successful performance of it. In the next section we describe the analysis phase and how to 
select the appropriate countermeasure in order to deal with risks. 
 
3.6. Analysis and Countermeasure Selection 
 
“An absolute can only be given in an intuition, while all the rest has to do with analysis.” 
Henri Bergson 
 
One of the pivotal tasks in project risk management is to select and apply the optimum 
countermeasure against the adverse event. To do it so we organize and perform a mitigation 
activity. Mitigation activity is an activity that we perform in order to relieve our properties and 
goals from a risk partly or completely. In order to mitigate the risk the organization, project 
manager or risk manager may have several strategies. Each of these strategies requires different 
costs, and the risk exposure reduction is different according to selected strategies. Any of these 
strategies with its mitigation cost and risk exposure reduction is a mitigation alternative. We use 
the term mitigation strategy or mitigation alternative in the coming sections interchangeably. 
Cost-effectiveness (CE) is a value in accordance with established criteria, which indicates how 
effective is the strategy to be applied for risk mitigation in terms of return of investment. In 
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organizational project risk management the most effective way of choosing the best mitigation 
alternative is to analyze the cost-effectiveness of the chosen strategy. The best alternative is 
chosen as the alternative among all the selected or available alternatives which has the best cost-
effectiveness value. In this section we discuss the importance of the unequivocal risk value and 
cost-effectiveness and we show how to establish it effectively avoiding errors. 
 
Usually when measuring quantitatively how severe a risk is or as we are used to say how risky 
the situation is, we calculate the expected average loss. As we discussed in subsection “Triple 
Estimation Method”, when we use triple estimation formula the average estimated loss (M) is 
considered a measure of risk. But it is not the only characterizing value of risk. We must take 
into account the dispersion (D) of the estimated values also. In this framework we define the risk 
value as a variable dependent on M and D parameters, loss distribution type and skewness of the 
distribution. This value is intended to represent the risk unequivocally and quantitatively. The 
risk value can be dependent on the risk tolerance of the organization, organizations attitude to the 
adverse event type, stability importance and so forth, but in our estimation method those factors 
are not taken into account. Alternatively we propose the risk facilitators to have their own 
judgment of those factors and make decisions. 
Whenever we have calculated the mean value and the deviation of estimated losses we can have 
general idea how risky the situation is expressed in terms of money. The mean value shows how 
much we will lose in average. Statistically we can explain it as for instance if we have 100 
similar risky situations we will lose in average approximately M amount of money. The outcome 
of this hazardous event may differ from expected M value dramatically. The main indicator of it 
is the mean deviation. The greater the deviation is the more the chance of having more diverged 
outcome from mean value is. Deviation is not the only indicator of unexpectedness of outcome 
of loss but it is the main indicator. Suppose we have estimated two risks by using the triple 
estimation method and calculated M and D parameters by formula (3) and (4) (Table 9): 
 min (SEK) most likely (SEK) max (SEK) M (SEK) D  
Risk1 0 20000 50000 22040 10752 
Risk2 10000 20000 40000 22040 6451 
 
Table 9: Sample of risk analysis 
We have the same mean value of two risks which is 22040 SEK but the deviation of estimated 
losses for first risk is almost two times greater than for the second. This means that we know less 
information about the first risk (hazardous event) and the estimators have secured their estimates 
by giving greater possible interval of losses. The exposure of the first risk is greater because it is 
more unpredictable and the expected losses fluctuate in a greater interval. Whenever we have the 
same mean value with different mean deviations it is easy to differentiate that the one which has 
greater deviation value is more risky. But when the mean values are different it is difficult to 
differentiate the severeness of them. 
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To define the risk value unequivocally we need to consider about two factors: 
 The risk value can be expressed by mean value plus some uncertainty caused by mean 
deviation that the real outcome of risk is different from mean value. 
 The mean deviation expresses the uncertainty but the weight of it is different from mean 
value to be simply summed. 
Comparing some estimates and results we propose to pick the     as a weight index for the 
deviation. After this denotation we can write the formula for risk value as presented below: 
    
 
 
                          (10) 
We do not take into account the risk tolerance of the organization, the volatility of it and other 
factors as it may vary from organization to organization and from situation to situation. Now the 
reader may wonder why we need to compare the risks and so to use this formula. In fact we do 
not need to compare two different risks but we do need to compare the same re-estimated risks in 
case of applying two or more mitigation alternatives. Suppose we have a risk that is estimated 
before the mitigation and re-estimated two times after specifying two possible mitigation 
alternatives. 
Risk No 1 min (SEK) most likely (SEK) max (SEK) M (SEK) D R 
Without mitigation 20000 40000 100000 48163 17204 51603 
Alternative 1 0 10000 10000 7959 2150 8389 
Alternative 2 0 15000 30000 15000 6451 16290 
 
Table 10: Sample of risk analysis using different mitigation alternatives 
Judging from the results after applying these two available mitigation strategies and re-
estimating the expected losses we see that the risk value in case of alternative 1 is two time as 
less severe as in case of alternative 2. If we do not spend money for applying those alternatives 
we must choose the alternative 1 to apply but usually when we foresee to realize a mitigation 
activity it costs some money: For instance buying insurance, paying for improvements of 
services, hiring necessary equipments and so on. To choose the best alternative taking into 
account the mitigation cost also we need to establish a cost-effectiveness indicator. Emanating 
from upper discussed results a good cost-effectiveness index can be the sum of mitigation cost 
and risk value: 
                                         (11) 
We can judge based on this indicator how effective to apply a specific mitigation strategy is in 
terms of money. The mitigation alternative that has the lowest CE index is the optimal one to 
apply. If we complete Table 10 by providing the mitigation cost and cost-effectiveness index we 
get the following results: 
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Risk No 1 min(SEK) most 
likely(SEK) 
max(SEK) M(SEK) D(SEK) R(SEK) Mitigation 
cost(SEK) 
CE(SEK) 
Without 
mitigation 
20000 40000 100000 48163 17204 51603 - 51603 
Alternative 1 0 10000 10000 7959 2150 8389 10000 18389 
Alternative 2 0 15000 30000 15000 6451 16290 2000 18290 
 
Table 11 - Sample of risk analysis using different mitigation alternatives and cost-effectiveness 
The mitigation cost of the first strategy is 10000 SEK which is quite expensive compared to the 
second alternative. By calculating the CE index now we have an unequivocal measure to choose 
an alternative. The results imply that although the first alternative has potential to reduce the risk 
much better but the expensive cost of it reduces the cost-effectiveness significantly. CE indexes 
for these two alternatives are equipollent. The CE of the second strategy is slightly less than the 
CE of first one. This implies that we can choose the second alternative as the most effective 
countermeasure but as the difference between 18389 SEK and 18290 SEK is not significant we 
can reconsider again about which alternative to choose taking into account other supportive 
factors also, for instance, risk tolerance of organization or mitigation covering cost compared 
with total budget. If the mitigation cost of the second alternative is 5000 SEK instead of 2000 
SEK and other numbers are the same then we have                                . 
In this case we have convincing difference between these two values so we can choose the first 
alternative. 
If we visualize the mitigation alternatives by cumulative density function (S-curve), we can see 
the corresponding curves and compare (Figure 8) [6]. The more left the curve is the lower the 
expectation of losses is and the flatter the curve is the greater the dispersion of the distribution is. 
As it can be seen in our example the alternative one (red curve) is the best alternative according 
to our established criteria. 
 
Figure 8: S-curve representation of mitigation alternatives 
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Before calculating the CE for any risk it is important to ponder about the loss distribution, 
skewness effect on loss distribution and thus re-consider about the weight of most likely value 
discussed in detail in subsection “Skewness effect on mean value”. If the risk is an “either-or” 
type then evaluation could be done by using the perceptive method for avoiding erroneous 
results. In the next section we elaborate the controlling and monitoring activities of risk 
volatility, mitigation performance and status. 
 
3.7. Risk Monitoring and Controling 
 
Risk management iteration without controlling and monitoring is like you, when practicing in front of your mirror 
on how to ask your girlfriend to marry you trying to reduce the chance of rejection and at the same time you do not 
pay attention to your phone which is ringing and a message from her arrives saying “I want to break you up…. “ 
          Anonymous 
 
The successive action after response plan and mitigation is the monitor and control. This section 
refers to monitoring and controlling phase which is ongoing unless the mitigation strategy is not 
completed and can make the difference between successful or failed risk management iteration. 
We start this section by discussing the importance of control and monitor with respect to the 
uncertainty parameters of a risk and the monitor of the selected mitigation strategies. Continuing 
we outline the control and monitor towards financial IT projects, we discuss how Ericsson 
applies this activity and we cite our solution broken down into simple steps by providing real life 
scenarios. 
 A general overview of this activity is that the external environment of risks is tracked and the 
effectiveness of the risk management iteration is evaluated through the project life cycle. We 
basically monitor and control the life cycle of the risk and the mitigation strategy applied on it 
till the time when we have dealt with the risk successfully. In our case that we have to deal with 
a financial IT project, the monitor and control activity is vital as it is iterative and sometimes the 
characteristics of the adverse event are unexpected. Iterative and unexpected events in the 
internal and mostly in the external environment of the financial IT project can affect the 
characteristics of the risks and our approach to deal with them. 
The purpose of monitoring and controlling is to examine the behavior of the hazardous event due 
to volatility of the uncertainty parameters and to keep track of the successful completion of the 
mitigation action. Volatility in risk management is a quality which describes how frequently the 
uncertainty parameters of hazardous situation change.  
The risk control and monitor phase has to be applied for every single risk regardless its 
characteristics and chosen mitigation activities. For instance in case of risk acceptance or transfer 
we might not perform any active response for mitigation but still we have to keep an eye on the 
behavior of the risk. Uncertain events that might happen to the internal or external environment 
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of the organization or the project might possibly influence the risk’s volatility and therefore we 
might have to change plans and considerations. 
Volatility becomes extremely important when we have to deal with risk in financial IT projects. 
A financial IT project is always depended on the stock and capital markets as well as on the 
currency exchange. In this financial environment changes can be made almost every minute and 
can determine the success or failure of the service. If we do not track these changes then we have 
an identified and evaluated risk that possibly within two weeks will have different characteristics 
and different impact and/or loss than the one we expected initially. 
As we discussed at the problem domain section the current risk management iteration at 
Ericsson, does not apply a standard approach for monitoring and controlling the volatility and 
mitigation strategies for the identified risks. Usually Ericsson performs the monitoring and 
controlling phase through emails or phone conversations between the project managers and the 
assigned persons who are responsible for mitigating the risks. This process is based on 
experience and it does not fulfill the Ericsson needs. In addition the current method can lead to 
misunderstandings, omissions and not accurate reporting. Important information might be lost 
during the communication and also different stakeholders might interpret them in different ways.  
Even if we have identified a risk clearly and we have analyzed it with accuracy, the whole 
iteration is incomplete if we are not able to monitor and control the risk’s life cycle.  In order to 
perform successful monitor and control activity we must track and report some specific 
information. Information such as the mitigation performance, the mitigation status and the 
responsible persons must be clearly identified and reported.  On the one hand we update every 
change that influences the risk and the mitigation activities and on the other hand all the relevant 
information is stored in a unique repository and they are retrieved effectively without possible 
losses through indirect communication. All the stakeholders involved in the risk management 
iteration have common view and understanding of every new action and activity related to risks. 
After examination and focusing on the most important aspects of the hazardous events, we have 
conceptualized the following steps in order to follow the monitor and control phase. Using as 
example the risks that we have discussed in the identification section we cite the steps of control 
and monitor conformable those two risks. 
Step 1: Report mitigation strategy 
Having all the identified risks along with the additional information (country, risk category and 
partner type) about them via the identification phase we report the chosen mitigation strategy for 
each risk individually. The available choices as we described in the response planning phase are: 
 Acceptance 
 Avoidance 
 Mitigation 
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 Reduction 
 Transfer 
 Share with partner 
 Overlook 
As we mentioned in the previous section Ericsson applies risk mitigation for Risk1 trying to 
prevent the failure of transaction. For Risk2 Ericsson comes to agreement to transfer the risk as 
mitigation strategy and therefore the financial institute is responsible to deal with it. But 
nevertheless Ericsson has to be informed about the mitigation performance and the volatility 
level of Risk2 in order to keep track of it. As we have discussed in the response plan section, 
whichever of the mitigation strategy is applied and even if it is risk transfer, it has to be reported 
in order to be monitored. Therefore the financial institution informs Ericsson in every control 
and monitor iteration about the mitigation performance and risk volatility. 
Step 2: Set start and finish date for mitigation and assign responsible person 
During this step we set the planned start and finished date of the mitigation activity and we 
designate who is responsible for the performance and control of it. Therefore we can expect 
when we deal with the risk and also to whom to talk to in case of emergency. 
In the case of Risk1 for instance Ericsson specifies that the risk mitigation will have duration of 
five weeks and Mr. John Brown is responsible for the successful completion. On Risk2 the 
financial institution informs Ericsson that the mitigation activity will last two weeks. The risk 
will be avoided and Mr. John Walkers is responsible to eliminate the risky elements. 
Step 3: Track volatility 
The risk volatility is reported and controlled in this step. After examination we have realized that 
it is more effective to describe volatility using simple qualitative level of specification. Therefore 
we divide the volatility level in three categories (In UniRisk we attach a specific colour to each 
one of the available choices). 
 Stable: Informs us that the internal and external factors that influence the risk are stable. 
The conditions remain the same and therefore the planned actions do fulfil its final 
purpose. The stable level is presented with green colour and indicates that we continue as 
we have planned. 
 
 Moderate: Specifies that the parameters of hazardous situation change but not as much 
that we have to change our plans. Nonetheless the moderate level indicates that we have 
to examine the risk’s environment more intensively. The internal and external 
environment of the risk has changed and we have to be careful. The yellow colour of the 
moderate level indicates a “stand by” mode. 
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 Highly Volatile: This level is presented with red colour and is the warning that the risk 
situation has been changed dramatically. Therefore we have to review our estimations of 
probability and loss, choose another mitigation alternative or plan a different mitigation 
strategy. 
In our example during the last monitor and control activity Ericsson has reported that the 
volatility of Risk1 is stable because the service provider operation has not been influenced and is 
the expected. On the other hand Risk2 is reported from the financial institute that has become 
moderate due to the unstable exchange rate variation between YEN and GBP. Nevertheless as 
we saw in the previous section the financial institution has decided to avoid this risk and 
therefore the volatility is not so important any more as the risky elements have been removed. 
Step 4: Report mitigation activity performance 
Mitigation activity performance shows quantitatively how completely is applied the established 
countermeasure to mitigate the risk in terms of percentages of overall effort. It is an easy way to 
have all stakeholders informed about how we progress with mitigation. The performance is 
presented with percentage and can have the values 0%, 25%, 50%, 75% and 100%. Its value 
along with a progress bar provides us the current completion state of the mitigation activity.  
Value that equals to 0% indicates that risk is in its identification phase and a mitigation strategy 
has not been planned or started yet. Value of 50% indicates that we are in the half way and 100% 
that the mitigation is completed successfully. 
The risk mitigation performance for Risk1 is reported to be 25% which means that Ericsson has 
already started the mitigation process. On the other hand the mitigation performance of Risk2 is 
100% which means that the financial institution has completely avoided the risk. 
Step 5: Monitor mitigation status 
This step indicates the status of the mitigation activity. Three words with the appropriate colour 
background can be presented and indicate the mitigation status. In UniRisk the status report is 
automatically connected to the mitigation performance. When the mitigation performance 
changes according to the given criteria, the status changes as well. Therefore the three status 
values are: 
 Open: Refers to the mitigation activity that has not been started yet and the performance 
of it is 0%. This choice is displayed with red colour. 
 In progress: Refers to the mitigation activities that have already started and their 
performance is between 0.1% and 99, 9%. The colour of this choice is yellow. 
 Closed: Refers to a completed mitigation activity and therefore we have performance of 
100%. This value is presented with green colour. 
57 | P a g e  
Based on the reported mitigation performance, the mitigation status for Risk1 is “In progress” as 
Ericsson has already started mitigating the risk and for Risk2 is “Closed”, because the financial 
institute has applied the risk avoidance strategy and has avoided the risk completely. 
Step 6: Update Review 
We report the date of the last checklist review and we describe briefly the last activity that has 
been performed during the monitor and control process. 
For both our risks the last review update has been done in the 25
th
 of April and both Ericsson and 
the financial institute reported all the last updates along with a description of the last mitigation 
action. 
Step 7: Report history of mitigation activity 
This step can provide guidance for the mitigation strategy and the monitoring of it. In case that 
we have faced the same or similar risk in the past and we have applied the same mitigation 
strategy to deal with it, we report our experience and lessons learnt in order to perform the 
mitigation strategy this time without facing issues that we probably have faced in the past. 
As Ericsson Money Services is the first financial IT project of Ericsson there is no mitigation 
activity history for Risk1. On the other hand the financial institute has significant experience in 
risks of type Risk2 and the lessons learnt from the past are used as guidance to deal with this 
case. 
Concluding this section we have to mention that in order to have successful control and monitor 
activity we are required to do frequent updates and reports of the risk’s uncertainty parameters 
and the performance of the mitigation strategies that are applied to every risk individually. The 
co-ordination of actions, the accurate estimation of time to deal with the risk and the proper 
mitigation performance reporting among the responsible persons of each mitigation strategy is 
vital with respect to risk dependencies in project and program level as we discuss in section 
“Risk Dependencies”.  
In the next section we focus on the risk overlook mitigation strategy that we have mentioned in 
the “Risk Response Plan” section, in order to deal with inceptive events of risk. The track and 
monitoring of inceptive events of risk is connected to the overall control and monitor phase of 
risk management iteration. 
 
 
 
 
58 | P a g e  
3.8. Inceptive Events of Risks 
 
“An elegant solution for keeping track of reality”  
 Ariande, Inception (2010) 
 
In the previous section we have described the control and monitor activities as we propose to be 
applied in the risk management iterations. As we have mentioned there are seven different 
categories of risk mitigation activities. One of them is the risk overlook. Risk overlook is applied 
to inceptive events of risk. An inceptive event of risk refers to an event that has been identified to 
be potentially hazardous, but we still examine specific internal and/or external factors that 
influence it in order to start dealing with it. Each internal and external factor that influences the 
particular risk is described as an event scenario. Once an uncertain factor becomes true, the 
event(s) in the scenario are triggered and therefore risk evaluation, analysis and mitigation has to 
be performed. In other words a potential risk is identified and we wait for a specific condition to 
become true in order to start dealing with this particular risk. 
During most of the risk management iterations inceptive events of risk are not included in the 
used checklists. Mostly they are not reported or documented and the different project or risk 
managers have them at the back of their mind. Therefore the inceptive events are difficult to be 
communicated, examined and tracked. For instance EURO is very unstable due to the financial 
crisis in the Euro zone. The likelihood of the EURO not to exist as a currency is significantly less 
due to the disciplinary measures that European Union has applied. The elimination of EURO as 
currency seems not to be highly probable but nevertheless is an inceptive event of risks, 
henceforth we identify it along with a scenario that pulls the trigger for a risk which becomes 
critical and requires examination.  
In this section the “EURO” scenario is used as guidance and we outline our approach on how 
inceptive events of risk should be reported and monitored. This scenario of inceptive event of 
risk is communicated between Ericsson and the financial institute as it can influence both the 
Ericsson Money Services normal operation and have financial impact as well. Using simple steps 
in this section we outline the phases to be followed in order to perform this activity. 
Step 1: Specify source of inceptive event of risk 
As we also do in the risk identification phase we specify the source of the risk by determining the 
risk category, country, source and partner type along with the description of the inceptive event 
of risk. In case of the EURO inceptive event of risk Ericsson specifies the characteristics of the 
inceptive event as presented below: 
Category: Financial and accounting 
Country type: Euro zone countries 
Source: Financial crisis 
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Partner Type: Bank 
Step 2:  Inceptive event description 
A description of the event is provided in this step. In our scenario Ericsson defines the inceptive 
event of risk as:  
“There is a possible elimination of EURO as currency in the Euro zone countries due to the 
financial crisis. Therefore Ericsson Money Services has to be aware that EURO might not be 
used as currency in the money transactions.” 
Step 3: Decide action  
Action is similar to mitigation strategy in case of inceptive events of risk. In this case we have 
two kinds of actions against the inceptive events of risk that is “act” or “overlook” the spawned 
hazardous situation. As we have described in the introduction of this section, for the inceptive 
events of risk we apply the risk overlook strategy initially and by default so we just monitor the 
condition of the inceptive event. Once the inceptive event generates risks then the mitigation 
strategy changes to “act” and we identify it as a risk and all the risk management iteration steps 
have to be performed to deal with it. In our case Ericsson leaves the default choice of action 
which is risk overlook. 
Step 4: Define trigger event 
This step can be characterized as the most momentous during this phase. Here is where the 
trigger event/scenario is specified. In case of this scenario becomes true we have to evaluate our 
risk, which emanates from the inceptive event a real risk that we need to deal with. Ericsson 
defines the trigger event as: 
“One of the countries that belong to Euro zone cannot get bailout package to fulfill its liabilities 
in terms of bonds to the capital markets and therefore it will be a credit event and by default the 
whole Euro zone will collapse. We must pay special attention to the financial situation in Greece, 
Portugal and Spain “ 
Step 5: Report tendency of trigger event 
Tendency provides us with the information about the trigger event and is the precursor to the 
status of the inceptive event of risk. The trigger event is examined in order to track its tendency 
and in sequence the status of the inceptive event of risk. The tendency is determined using 
arrows that express how the trigger event tends to be. The arrows can point three directions; up, 
horizontal and down. 
Positive: In this case the conditions that influence the trigger event tend to become more and 
more encouraging. This means that the trigger event has even less possibility to become true. 
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The positive tendency is presented as a green arrow pointing up.  A positive event for Ericsson 
is:  
“Currently there is no country in the Euro zone that is not able to fulfill its liabilities”.  
Stable: This value indicates that the trigger event does not tend to get better or worse. The 
condition remains the same as it was when we identified the trigger event. The arrow has yellow 
colour and a horizontal direction which represents the stability of the trigger event. 
“The financial condition in Greece, Portugal and Spain remains the same”. 
Negative: When this value is presented it means that the trigger event is prone to worsening and 
it influences also the inceptive event of risk status. The negativity is presented with a red arrow 
that is pointing down. A negative tendency can be described by Ericsson as: 
Apart from Greece, Portugal and Spain after the latest reports from the European Commission, 
Italy is also in financial instability”. 
Step 6: Report status of inceptive risk event 
The status report refers to the inceptive event of risk that is described in step two. We monitor 
and track the status of the given inceptive event of risk in order to update the latest condition of 
it. We propose three values for status that are expressed as traffic lights colors: 
Green: We examine the inceptive event of risk and we see that the condition of it is unchanged 
and thus positive, which means that the internal and external factors are in a positive situation.  
In the Ericsson case this means that:  
“The stock and capital markets in the Euro zone are in positive trend so the countries that are in 
danger seem to be able to pay their liabilities.” 
Yellow: After examination of the inceptive event of risk we see that the condition become worse 
than before and therefore Ericsson might soon have to deal with the inceptive event as a real risk. 
“The capital and stock markets are discouraging and the credit default swaps of Greece are 
dramatically high, which means that is quite possible for Greece not to be able to pay its 
liabilities.” 
Red: If this value appears then it means that the inceptive event become a risk that we have to 
deal with. The red status is close to match the inceptive event of risk description which means 
that what we have expected has high probability to happen. The trigger event is activated and 
therefore the inceptive event of risk became a real risk that Ericsson has to evaluate, examine and 
mitigate.  
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“Greece is not able to bail out its liabilities. The country defaults, thus the whole Euro zone is 
close to collapse and the entire Euro zone countries will use again their pre euro currencies. “ 
Step 7: Report Update: 
In this step we simply report the last date of tracking the status of the inceptive risk event and the 
tendency of the trigger event. 
The two core steps of this activity are five and six which are connected and interacted with each 
other. The status of the risk inceptive event is determined by the tendency of the trigger event. 
Nine combinations of status and tendency are possible. The best scenario is “Green” status with 
“Positive” tendency and in this case the inceptive event of risk is the least likely to become risk. 
The worst case is “Red” status with “Negative” tendency which means that the likelihood of the 
inceptive event to originate an active risk is the highest possible. When we meet “Red” status 
with “Negative” tendency then the change of action is enabled and turns from “risk overlook” to 
“act”.  The philosophy behind this method is that in the worst case, the inceptive event of risk 
becomes automatically an identified specific risk to be evaluated, analyzed and mitigated. All the 
rest seven possibly cases are leaved to the project and risk managers to judge whether the 
inceptive event of risk has to be further examined and monitored or to be accepted and ignored. 
Performing the inceptive events of risk identification and monitor we conclude complete and 
thorough risk management iteration. Besides analysis and controlling of the already known risks 
we have now taken action for inceptive events of risks that have the character of potential risks. 
Our sleeps can become more peaceful from now on. 
 
3.9. Risk Iteration Report 
 
“Initial reports are encouraging. In the end of the day, it's going to be deeds, not words that matter.”  
Stephen Hadley 
 
After completion of the phases that are described previously, in this section the project risk 
management iteration is close to termination. The final phase that completes full project risk 
management iteration is a summarized final report that is presented and distributed among all the 
participants of the iteration. The essence of this phase is the comprehensive information for the 
participants about the results of the iteration and the participants’ self-examination on the whole 
process and preparation for the next project risk management iteration. The final iteration report 
has the serviceableness as the input for the coming iterations. The duration of producing the 
report using UniRisk is immediate. Nevertheless specific disagreements, concerns and comments 
on the reported results must be written down and reported. The duration of this process depends 
on the participants and the specific deadlines that the risk iteration facilitator sets. 
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In this report the most important information collected during all the phases of the risk 
management iteration are presented, moreover, the following outputs are summarized: 
 A complete list of the identified risks 
 The risk value without mitigation for each risk individually 
 The risk value and cost effectiveness of all the mitigation alternatives for each risk 
individually 
 The best alternative along with its cost effectiveness for each risk is highlighted 
 The responsible person for each mitigation activity 
 Enrolment of the participants according to their experience where they can reason 
whether the chosen mitigation alternative seems to fit its purpose.  
 Assumptions and concerns about the iteration and the outcome of it. 
 
The results above are documented and presented using a template that consists of standard 
sections. In addition to the output described above there is some general information about the 
project and the risk management iteration that is presented as well in the report such as: 
 Date of the project risk management iteration 
 The project  risk management iteration ID 
 Customers ID and name 
 The operational region of the project 
 List of facilitator and participants 
 The money currency of the values used during the evaluation 
 A small overview of the taken decisions  
 Feedback on the effectiveness of the iteration 
 
In case of projects that run under the same program and enable correlated risks, the report 
contains all the information presented above plus the report of the project representatives on how 
successfully they completed the beforehand discussed and assigned or commissioned tasks 
concerning correlated projects or risks.  
Through this section (Proposed Solution) we have presented in details all the phases of the 
project risk management iteration, starting from the identification till the final report and the 
presentation of the results. In the coming section we discuss the risk dependencies technique and 
how it can be integrated to the project risk management iteration. 
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3.10. Risk Dependencies 
 
“Never make solid plans when you depend on others, True Story” 
Anonymous 
 
In big organizations such as Ericsson they usually have several projects implementing different 
parts of one product. Mostly when different projects move towards the same goal they may have 
one coordinating center called program. The program is an organizational structure which aims 
to create a business value and includes several interrelated projects. In such organizations the 
risk management process becomes a complicated task and it is sometimes hard to make optimal 
decisions for the mitigation activities and control. This section is focused on introducing a simple 
and easy-to-use instruction for managing risks in program context.  
The risk dependency or just a dependency in a program is the interrelation of two or more 
projects due to an emerged risk in any of those projects. Dependency level of two projects 
indicates the relative severeness of the impact on one project when the second project is 
suffering from a setback [13]. The different types of projects dependencies because of risks are: 
 A risk that is arisen in one project can be arisen in another project also (probably with 
different severeness) thus affecting whole program. 
 In several projects while performing risk mitigation the same risk can be mitigated 
multiple times because of unawareness and lack of communication among projects. 
 One risk that is identified in one project could be latent in another project. This case 
particularly is important when the first project decides to accept the risk whereas it has 
significantly greater effect on the later one and mitigation is vital. 
 Two or more risks emerged in several projects are correlated thus raising the overall 
impact. 
Whenever an organization tries to establish a way of communication and report between projects 
in a program it will confront a complicated task:  
 How to organize communication process effectively and in a simple way? 
 What information must be transferred across projects while identifying risks? 
 How intensively exchange the necessary information across the projects? 
 What is the next step when the information is provided? 
 What if we have different software development methodologies? 
 After all is the specified way of communication effective and not time consuming? 
The task becomes more complicated when it comes to financial IT projects in case of which 
there are external partners with whom negotiations, risk sharing activities and contracts can be 
established. Usually not only program but also projects can perform some independent activities 
such as negotiations and contracts. In this case we have all the possible interactions due to 
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emerged adverse event. Figure 9 is an example of how several projects can be dependent on 
program, external partners or to each other. Blue arrows show the possible dependencies 
between units due to emerged risks. The interactions between partners are considered to have 
comparably little effect on the program. 
 
Figure 9: Risks dependencies among projects, program and partners 
If we assume that all projects follow the Waterfall model we can insist that the risk management 
activities are carried on with the same intensiveness say in every two week. This claim is 
confirmed by Ericsson where the PROPS models have established definite schedule for risk 
analysis and mitigation. Whenever we have firmly established schedule for risk management 
activities in every project and thus in the program we can schedule the time in a way that risk 
analysis and assessment take place in the same day for all the projects. During risk assessment in 
program level all the projects have their representatives. The only task in this case is to discuss 
and decide who the responsible is for a certain risk and in the next session or meeting before 
beginning the new identification and assessment the representatives can report about mitigation 
status of a risk which was assigned in previous session. The view is different when we have 
different development methodologies. While in Waterfall model there is an established schedule 
for risk analysis, the projects following Agile processes and particularly Scrum do not have any 
routine for performing risk management activities. Instead it is done as the team finds convenient 
or relevant to do (usually more intensively then in Waterfall based processes). When we address 
to create a method for communicating and settling issues of dependencies we must take into 
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account the fact that we cannot oblige projects to do untimely assessment to provide the 
necessary results. Examining all these issues and facts we establish the following steps and 
information registering mechanisms to provide a simple and effectual procedure of controlling 
risk dependencies in program context: 
Step one: Setting private risk management schedule 
In every project there is established schedule (depending on the project development 
methodology the time frequency of analysis and mitigation can differ) of doing risk analysis. 
Frequency of identification and analysis process and estimation methods does not affect herein 
described procedure. 
Step two: Independent assessment of risks 
The risk management responsible person (risk manager, project manager, scrum master…) with 
the analysis team fulfils risk identification and loss estimation for every risk in the project 
context. The mitigation activity, cost and later activities must not be specified yet. 
Step three: Report to program level 
For the purpose of risk report from projects to program level there must be created an email 
account wherein from the projects the necessary information must be sent and on which the 
program manager can have control (In some cases a partner organization can be provided with 
this email address to provide any common risk that they may have). The program manager must 
register the risk description and assessed impact in the risk management tool. The risks that have 
no direct impact to other projects must not be provided otherwise they will overload the 
dependency evaluation process. This kind of risks can be discussed orally in reporting process 
and program manager will decide to register those or not. If it is quite clear that the risk is purely 
concerning to only own project, then the project manager does not need to report it at all. The 
program manager must check the email in every week*. 
Step four: Registering the necessary information in the checklist 
The program manager with the risk analysis team specifies the time and interval for the risk 
analysis activity in program level. During the program’s risk identification process the risk 
facilitator with the other participants have all the registered risks by weekly checking of the 
email.  
 
 
*We found that when there is a scrum following project one week can be the best choice but depending on the 
stability level of projects, their risk tolerance, external effects and other number of reasons the program manager 
with the analysis team can decide how frequently to check email and update the information.  
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Based on this information they make the decision on which risks of the projects must go to the 
program level for mitigation, which ones must be mitigated in the same project, which should be 
mitigated in other/several projects at the same time (communication between those projects can 
be established in very short and informative way, succinct oral negotiation and agreement) and 
which must be negotiated with a partner organization or shared. Having all the reports from all 
projects the risk management team should also discuss which risks are correlated. All these 
information must be registered in UniRisk. The information that must be filled in for a risk in the 
tool is: 
 The reported risk description 
 In which project the risk has been identified 
 The dependency level of other projects from the one where the risk is identified, 
expressed with three qualitative indicators: Low, moderate and high 
 Risk exposure values for all the projects that have this risk and for the program 
 In which project it should be mitigated or with which partner must be shared. 
 The active mitigation cost 
 The risk number that has correlation with it. 
 The status of the mitigation performance 
Step five: Completion of assigned tasks 
After having all the information about a risk (which project can be affected, in which project it 
must be mitigated, dependencies of projects according to that risk, mitigation cost and 
correlation with other risks), the project and program managers complete their risk management 
activities in their projects/program level. In the coming report project managers inform about 
how they have completed the agreed assignments or they can be informed if the risk is closed 
already in other projects or program. 
Step six: Iteration end and inception 
The iteration cycle finishes when program risk analysis activity is done. Then the iteration starts 
again. During the iteration a project manager may report several times or not at all. It depends on 
the period of the risk analysis activity and the software development methodology. The 
information mentioned in step four that must be filled in UniRisk is not obligatory. The program 
manager may decide not to fill the mitigation cost or a project manager may decide not to 
estimate the risk relative exposure. The obligatory fields that must be marked are:  which project 
the risk can affect (dependency level) and who the responsible is for the mitigation. Specifying 
mitigation status also will be helpful. The figure below visualizes this six-step procedure. 
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Figure 10: Risks dependencies method visualized 
The usage of the procedure does not allow the user to calculate the correlation level of risks or 
how much the risk impact on one project affects to other projects but it allows to communicate 
the already identified risks in program context and to manage those risks, their interrelation and 
correlation effectively. 
As we have shown in the previous sections the first eight steps of risk management do not need 
to have any beforehand specified frequency. In different projects and with different development 
methodologies the frequency of risk analysis sessions is different. The first eight steps of the risk 
management iteration can be performed independently according to specific characteristics of 
each project and based on the software development methodology that is applied. The 
identification, estimation, analysis and mitigation activities cannot be affected by the software 
development methodology as they do not require beforehand specified timeframe. Conversely 
when it comes to dependencies, different projects have different frequency of risk management 
session, nevertheless, as we have presented earlier in this section the project risk facilitators do 
not need to consider about other projects’ risk management activities. Instead they must send the 
necessary information to the program risk facilitator whenever they have new identified risks. It 
is the program risk facilitator who needs to check the sent information every two weeks 
obligatory. This last activity is carried out in program level independently from any software 
development methodology in any project, hence is not influenced by any project characteristics. 
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4. Evaluation 
 
“True genius resides in the capacity for evaluation of uncertain, hazardous, and conflicting information.” 
Winston Churchill 
 
Aiming to secure the effectiveness and accuracy of the results that our work brought to light and 
also test the usability of UniRisk we have had to evaluate our work across real life scenarios. 
UniRisk was built in order to serve professionals in risk management and also beginners in the 
field. Therefore the evaluation has focused on these two categories of people and it consists of 
two parts each one of which has aimed to provide a different result and feedback covering 
different aspects of our results. 
The first part of evaluation is to test UniRisk is real projects that Ericsson launch or will launch 
in the future. During this phase the final version of UniRisk that we have delivered to Ericsson 
will be used as an option for completing the risk management iterations both in project and 
program level. Ericsson stakeholders will apply our approach through the implemented tool in 
order to perform risk management for the planned projects. Due to time constraints of delivering 
our final thesis and also to reorganization of Ericsson units the current period, this part of 
evaluation will come with a delay and after the completion of the thesis. Nevertheless the 
feedback that Ericsson will give is of high importance as it represents the opinion of experts on 
our work. 
The second part was the UniRisk testing by our university colleagues that have limited 
knowledge in risk management. This process was carried out by giving some simple daily life 
scenarios to them and asking to evaluate the uncertain situations by providing their estimations. 
The results given by UniRisk were matching with the expectations of our colleagues. During this 
phase of evaluation we focused intensively to the perceptive method aiming to prove that the 
choice of available words makes the selection of likelihood to the uncertain events easy for the 
user. In addition during this part we received consultation and we had discussions with 
professors form the literature and language department of the University of Gothenburg and with 
Prof. Steen Lichtenberg owner of Lichtenberg and Partners management consulting company 
and former professor of Project Management & Project Economy at the Technical University of 
Denmark. Indeed the feedback that we got from our colleagues was very positive as they found 
our method understandable and easy to use. Moreover Prof Lichtenberg showed interest to our 
approach and he mentioned that in the past during forums and conventions of risk management 
they have tried to create such an approach for “either-or types” of risks. 
Concluding the evaluation of our work we have to present our results and submit the final 
document to our examiner. The final oral presentation and opposition will give us the 
opportunity to make clear if we finally met the requirements of the university and the aims and 
purpose of the master thesis from an academic perspective. 
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5. Discussion 
 
“Discussion in America means dissent.” 
James Thurber 
 
Whatever set of rules or principles we establish while performing an activity we always need to 
ponder about how the vagueness of these principles will affect the pursued results. As a financial 
IT project risk management approach the set of principles and mechanisms that we propose does 
not require much administrative time and effort. The main reason is that it does not suggest 
collecting all the possible information that can enlighten uncertainties while developing financial 
project. For instance we purposely avoid discussing all the constitutional issues of different 
countries or different financial institutions which might prevent establishing contract with 
Ericsson Money Services. Instead we propose to register the country or contracting partner type 
and examine specific issues only. Later we can use the identified issues as new information for 
new contracts. Likewise we specify how to deal with projects dependencies among a program by 
specifying an effective and easy-to-use method for keeping track of the common risks among the 
projects and their correlations. Nevertheless we do not calculate how much the correlation of two 
risks quantitatively is or identify if it is negative or positive correlation. Usually in financial 
institutions it is pivotal task to identify the correlated risks but when it comes to IT projects it is 
not that important to do full scale analysis and it is let up to the project managers to understand 
and manage details relying on their experience and predictions. Conversely we pay much 
attention to assessing the risk exposure quantitatively because this is the pivotal action in risk 
management and requires as much precision as possible to understand how to select the right 
countermeasure and apply it. But at the same time whichever method is applied for risk 
assessment it must be not only effective in terms of having sufficient enough results but also 
simple to be applicable and available not only for risk managers but also any experts in the 
software engineering field.  
The triple estimation formula as we have discussed is proven to be more effective and 
trustworthy despite the arisen issues because of skewness effect of loss distribution. Analysis 
shows that it is not possible to have a standard formula or approach to apply and bypass the 
skewness effect on risk assessment but it is possible to know some simple rules and be orientated 
according to these rules to reduce maximally the errors. Alternatively we suggest a new method 
to tackle the “either-or” type of risks which are burden for triple estimation approach. Although 
the perceptive method, which aims to deal with “either-or” type of risks, seems to be easy and 
relies on human perception of reality by using natural language, it is not applied on assessing real 
industry risks and we suggest that it can be improved in its evolution immensely. 
The main hindrance of creating a competent method for financial IT project risk management is 
that there is not a similar study to examine and understand the key factors to concentrate on 
detail examination. The risk management approaches that are applied in banking systems or 
safety critical systems are totally different and either are not applicable or take too much 
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administrative time and effort to justify its application. For instance in banking systems they 
usually collect vast amount of statistical data and might do regression analyses or in safety 
critical systems such as NASA operations they usually concentrate on the human factor of error 
and regard whole system as a homo-technological system. 
The mathematical formulas that we suggest are reasoned based on both life time experience and 
mathematically provable arguments. Conversely the other steps of herein risk management 
procedure rely on critical thinking and have framed on the ground of Ericsson Money Services 
operations. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
A conclusion is the place where you get tired of thinking. 
Arthur Bloch 
 
As we stated at the purpose and result sections at the beginning of the document the expected 
results of our work were specified at an early stage of the thesis. Nevertheless during the process 
of completing the thesis we have examined a variety of aspects and provided solutions to issues 
that can possibly rise during the project risk management iteration and were not specified at the 
beginning of our work. This section provides a compact outline of our findings and results and it 
is divided in two sub sections which are the theory behind the functionality of UniRisk and the 
effective application of UniRisk during the project risk management iteration for financial IT 
projects and IT projects in general.  
Our approach on how to perform project risk management consists of eight main steps plus a 
ninth one in case that we have projects that run under the same program and risk dependencies 
and correlations has to be identified. A brief summary of our findings on each step of project risk 
management is outlined below. 
 Project risk management iteration 
 
The key facilitator and participants are identified and informed about the purpose of the process, 
the expected result and the role that each one will have during the process. Moreover, the 
frequency of the iteration during the life cycle of the project has to be determined. 
 Risk identification  
 
The potential risks are identified and registered based on specific properties of them. The source 
and type of these specific properties we have clearly specified. In addition we have provided 
guidance on how to register and examine potential risks according these properties. 
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 Qualitative assessment 
 
Our research and solution approach have shown that the qualitative assessment of risks as it is 
applied by Ericsson is only effective for the prioritization of risks and cannot give trustworthy 
results of qualitative attributes of risks. In addition we have outlined the weaknesses of this 
method and we proposed our approach on how to use it efficiently. 
 Quantitative assessment 
 
The skewness of loss distribution as the main hindrance of applying triple estimation method, 
while assessing risks quantitatively is discussed and evaluated. We also have determined the risk 
value and cost-effectiveness of the mitigation alternative unequivocally. 
 Perceptive method 
 
Based on human perception of the reality and its expression by natural language we have 
developed a method to deal with “either-or” type of risks. We have discussed the purpose of this 
method, the analysis behind it and the special cases where its application most likely can bring 
more accurate results than the traditional methods. 
 Risk response planning  
 
We have provided our approach on how to specify the risk response planning and have identified 
a set of possible response plans that cover all the aspects of response types to risks along with 
simple scenarios in order to make clear in which cases each one is applicable. 
 Analysis and countermeasure selection 
 
We have achieved a detailed presentation of the different mitigation alternatives to a risk with 
respect to the mitigation cost, the risk value and the cost-effectiveness. In UniRisk we managed 
to present all the possible alternatives for a single risk, display comparable probability-loss 
distribution curves and highlight the best alternative along with the cost-effectiveness of it. 
 Risk monitoring and controlling 
 
We have specified all the needed indicators in order to keep track of the volatility of risks and 
also control the performance of the planned mitigation activities. In UniRisk we have 
implemented this process to be performed simply and automatically using standard notation. 
 Inceptive events of risks 
 
This concept relies on registering the inceptive suspicious events which might become later risks 
in order to control and monitor potential risky situations that do not require any specific actions. 
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Dependent on some specific conditions that influence these risky situations we can make 
decision to regard these events as risks or follow the possible variations. Through UniRisk we 
provide a simple way to keep track and control such situations. 
 Risk iteration report 
 
At the end of each project risk management iteration a final report has to be delivered to all the 
participants. We have highlighted which information is needed to be documented and the 
purpose of the report for the coming iterations. 
 Risk dependencies 
 
We have created a method on how to identify risk dependencies and correlated risks arisen in 
projects that are interconnected to each other’s and run under the same program. This method is 
fully integrated to UniRisk in order to save time and have an organized full approach on project 
risk management. 
Final outcome of the analysis and findings of the phases described above is implemented in 
UniRisk which is a complete tool capable to perform all the necessary activities of project risk 
management. UniRisk is a user friendly, efficient and automatic checklist tool that is easy to 
understand, use and modify and refers both to experienced practitioners and beginners in the 
field. The tool also gives freedom to users to modify, change and examine critically the given 
results by providing their opinions, concerns and assumptions. 
Concluding we have examined the application of project risk management through the software 
development methodologies and particularly Waterfall PROPS and Agile Scrum. The risk 
management procedure that we have introduced in this framework is shown to be easily 
integrable in any financial IT program containing several projects which run according to 
different development methodologies but on the other hand the management process can be very 
flexible and be adapted to every different kind of project individually. In addition we have 
analyzed the critical factors that influence the application of risk management. Therefore we 
leave an open window on how to specifically apply project risk management which relies on the 
different goals and needs that different organizations and projects have. Nevertheless risk 
management is a critical process that has to be mandatory when building and maintaining a 
product and can determine significantly possible success or failure. 
We would like to mention that since the 4
th
 of April 2012, Ericsson Money Services is not longer 
available due to unknown possibly technical issues. Nevertheless UniRisk is applied to other 
projects running in the division of M-Commerce of Ericsson.  
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